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PREFACE 
he EU budget was developed to assist the EU in achieving its 
objectives. It is admittedly small, however, and is unlikely to reach 
the levels of finance that are in accordance with its objectives. 
Nevertheless, as this report highlights, the EU’s budget interventions are 
anything but inconsequential. Most notably, the EU budget is a visible and 
material representation of the EU’s priorities. Yet over the years, the 
allocation of the budget has increasingly been criticised as an inefficient use 
of resources. The budget is not a good representation of the EU’s political 
commitments, which has tarnished its image. 
This report does not dwell on the weaknesses of the EU budget, but 
rather offers a clear way forward for integrating climate change objectives 
into the budget coherently and effectively. The study first takes stock of the 
implications of climate change for the EU. It moves on to present a related, 
functional series of reforms that are not only feasible, but also reinforce 
action on other EU objectives. Integrating climate efforts across the EU’s 
budget would help foster more sustainable development generally – in line 
with the Lisbon and Gothenburg agendas.  
Finally, the central quality of this report is that it is grounded on facts 
and on what is possible for the EU budget, given its unique characteristics. 
Its recommendations do not aim to revolutionise the EU budget, but they 
do show how the EU could revolutionise its impact. 
Anders Wijkman 
Chairman 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
he discussions on the future of the EU budget are reaching an 
important turning point, with the European Commission supposed 
to publish its long-awaited, budget review document. Unfortunately, 
in recent years and amidst the review process, the number and kinds of 
challenges facing the EU have changed. Most notably, the world has been 
shaken by two crises – the global, financial meltdown and a worldwide 
food crisis – in addition to the prospects of catastrophic climate change. The 
reform of the EU budget has to take stock of these pressing and to large 
extent unprecedented global concerns. Indeed, the public consultation 
launched by the European Commission on the review of the EU budget 
placed climate change among the top priorities. 
A common characteristic of all three challenges is that they call for 
serious policy action, substantial public resources and are linked to a 
significant degree of uncertainty. While the impact of the financial crisis 
may ebb away, efforts to manage global food requirements, mitigate the 
adverse effects of climate change and foster adaptation entail very complex 
issues and possibilities. Opinions on what actions to take diverge as wildly 
as do the forecasts for the long-term impacts of climate change. We have a 
broad sense of what is coming, but how to approach it remains unclear. 
Future food and climate risks give rise to complicated scenarios in a 
number of areas, ranging from food, trade and energy policy, to external 
aid and security. 
For the budget review, this has introduced a whole new set of factors 
to consider. No longer can the discussion about the future of the budget 
concentrate on reforming the common agricultural policy (CAP) or 
targeting R&D and the cohesion policy more towards growth. The Lisbon 
agenda, until recently the central project of the EU, is today just one of 
several critical matters with which it must deal.  
T 2 | EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
This report considers the impacts of climate change and the extent to 
which the EU budget can effectively assist in addressing them. Based on 
the analysis, the report recommends the following fundamental reforms to 
the EU budget, which are necessary for the EU to achieve its objectives on 
climate change, along with helping it to lead the global effort to curb 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and adapt to the changes: 
•  Increase the support to R&D on energy and climate change, and more 
specifically expand the financial support for the Strategic Energy 
Technology (SET) Plan and the demonstration of new technology, in 
which the risks and long-term maturity of the projects precludes the 
possibility of exclusively private participation. 
•  Boost the support for trans-European and pan-European energy and 
transport links, with an emphasis on interconnectors and rail. The 
motorway tax Eurovignette should be introduced across the EU and 
be partially used to fund green transport links. 
•  Promote, through the guidance function of EU funding, the adoption 
of the best energy-efficiency practices, and especially 
–  reinforce support for energy efficiency and renewable energy; 
–  introduce best-practice conditionalities across all funding areas; 
–  support the development of low carbon cities and regions in the 
EU to test and promote new technologies on a large scale, and 
take advantage of the need to renew energy grids in new 
member states; and 
–  introduce energy-efficiency conditionalities and best practices in 
EU procurement rules. 
•  Reduce the share of the CAP in the EU budget by finding new 
financial mechanisms to introduce national co-financing, taking into 
account the national fiscal positions. 
•  Focus research on emission reductions and improved land 
management in agriculture, particularly possibilities for increasing 
the carbon storage capacities of land. 
•  Increase the EU’s interventions on environmental matters, taking into 
consideration the need to protect ecosystems and promote resource 
efficiency. 
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•  Concentrate more resources on waste management to reduce 
methane emissions more quickly. 
•  Better coordinate external action on climate change, centralising the 
effort and preferably funding of the EU’s obligations through the 
external action budget. 
•  Extend the reach of the EU budget by expanding the use of financial 
mechanisms through the financial sector, most notably the European 
Investment Bank (EIB). In addition, a fundamental reform should be 
envisaged by which the European Commission is allowed to raise 
capital by issuing EU bonds for large projects of EU-wide interest. 
In arriving at these conclusions, the report analyses the major 
difficulties ahead and looks at methods through which the EU budget, 
given its limitations, can most effectively assist the EU in reaching its 
emissions targets and meeting its adaptation needs. It takes into 
consideration the objectives of the EU, the principles that should govern its 
interventions and the limitations of the budget. 
The EU budget was out of line with the EU’s objectives and concerns 
well before the crises struck and climate change became a central priority. 
Yet the budget has the potential to play an important role in a number of 
areas, notably climate change. Aligning the EU budget towards 
transforming the energy sector, reducing other emissions, helping regions 
implement mitigation and adaptation policies, supporting R&D and 
creating green jobs is not only justifiable, it is also in line with the need to 
develop a sustainable, knowledge economy, i.e. the Lisbon and 
Gothenburg agendas. 
The report shows that the EU budget has to integrate climate 
considerations across the entire spectrum of its actions, given the highly 
varied and horizontal implications of climate change. The EU budget needs 
to be climate ‘proofed’, i.e. compatible with the mitigation and adaptation 
requirements of the EU. 
The four functions for which it is the most appropriate instrument to 
promote EU objectives in this area are listed below. 
a.  Solidarity.  The EU budget is the best existing, financial solidarity 
instrument among the EU member states. The potential for climate 
change mitigation and the necessity of adaptation may be highest in 
countries with little budgetary resources. Thus, support through the 
EU budget may be an effective way to ensure important investments 
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are made where they would not have otherwise occurred. Where 
large transboundary benefits are expected, the EU budget can act as a 
mechanism to ensure an appropriate level of burden sharing among 
beneficiaries. 
b.  Guidance. The EU budget can be used as an incentive for attracting 
investment in specific areas through its leverage instruments. Where 
important EU priorities are unlikely to be funded locally, because the 
EU-wide benefits are greater than the local ones, the EU budget is a 
powerful tool to draw in the necessary investments. Trans-European 
energy and rail infrastructure, R&D or environmental actions with 
cross-border effects are such cases. Conditionalities for funds offered 
for poorer regions can be highly influential on national and regional 
development strategies.  
c.  Loan guarantees. The use of some of the EU budget to increase the 
loan guarantee funds of the EIB would represent another very 
effective instrument in the release of loans to the private sector for 
more risky venture-capital investments or large, complex, longer-
term projects. Loan guarantees are already used for example by the 
European Investment Fund of the EIB. It has been recorded that the 
participation of the EIB in projects has helped to attract venture 
capital from other private financial institutions. The scope to expand 
into such instruments is large, but it will require further re-evaluation 
of the role of the EU budget – which is still very much based on a 
grant/subsidy mentality.  
d.  Coordinated external action. Generally, the use of centrally 
coordinated action for foreign assistance is theoretically considered 
more efficient than each member state running separate programmes. 
Funding for development actions abroad, which should be 
compatible with adaptation and mitigation objectives, could be better 
accomplished by a common EU instrument. A single voice from the 
EU within international institutions – backed by a single powerful 
instrument – would strengthen the negotiating position of the EU and 
help the EU to promote its visions of climate action and development. 
It would also increase the EU’s visibility and make it more 
accountable. National programmes, even using common criteria, face 
higher risks of overlapping and running into coordination problems. 
 
 FOR A FUTURE SUSTAINABLE, COMPETITIVE AND GREENER EU BUDGET | 5 
 
The financial limitations of the EU’s budget restrict the EU’s actions, 
and hence its role is greatly affected by national strategies. Coherence with 
programmes and policies in the recipient countries and regions is 
paramount. 
One of the most important objectives of the EU is to implement its 
energy and climate change package and manage to achieve its objective to 
reduce emissions by 20% in 2020 (up to 30% in the case of similar efforts by 
other industrialised countries) and by 60-80% or more in 2050. The EU 
budget could play a crucial role through well-devised interventions. 
First, the EU budget could facilitate the realisation of an integrated 
energy grid by supporting the completion of energy interconnections 
among member states through the budget for trans-European networks 
(TENs). This is vital for energy security, energy efficiency and the 
completion of a single market in energy. Given the objective of developing 
a large-scale, renewable energy capacity, it is also important that HVDC 
(high-voltage direct current) connections link member states. These allow 
long-distance energy transport with low levels of energy loss, and they can 
help counteract the fluctuations of energy intensity arising from renewable 
energy sources while minimising the need for backup energy production. 
Work in this area will also enable linkage across the EU as a whole to the 
best renewable energy locations – sun from the south, and wind and hydro 
from the north. 
Another key role for the EU is in R&D. Through its budget and the 
SET Plan, the EU could speed up the development of new technologies. EU 
action can pool the knowledge of the best researchers and leading 
industries with joint programmes. In addition to providing funds for 
research, the EU budget could cater for the need to support the large-scale 
testing and deployment of new technologies, where the upfront investment 
is too high given the risk involved for private companies to undertake this 
in isolation. Care has to be taken to ensure adherence to the principles of 
additionality and proportionality. The EU should be adding to and not 
substituting national public or private funding, and catalysing these 
resources to enhance their impact. The report indicates that there are 
structural problems within the EU that limit R&D investments from the 
private sector, and that member states should investigate how to introduce 
the necessary positive incentives. 
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The cohesion policy could also play an important role. Especially in 
the new member states, the energy grid is out of date and requires 
upgrading. Through its cohesion and structural funds, the cohesion policy 
could promote the creation of low carbon zones and co-finance new 
interconnectors and smart grid systems with the involvement of national 
authorities and energy companies. The present assistance for green energy 
still consists of single projects without a coherent strategy. The EU could 
help build highly effective and coordinated programmes.  
The creation of low carbon zones along with the transformation of 
energy and transport systems in poorer countries and regions will foster 
the creation of green jobs, as well as the development of a modern 
knowledge economy. It is an opportunity not to be missed. There is a need, 
however, to improve the strategic planning and implementation capacity in 
member states. Many are ill prepared to handle such complex multiannual 
and highly integrated developments. The level of state participation and 
the in-depth collaboration needed among state departments, regional 
bodies, the research community, private business and wider civil society is 
for many administrations unprecedented. 
EU funds could additionally support actions to reduce methane 
emissions, especially by tackling those from waste and other sources from 
urban areas. Methane is a potent GHG and a number of known sources can 
be easily neutralised. This could be done in Objective 1 regions, for 
example, through the structural funds for waste management programmes.  
Stronger environmental action is essential and the EU should have a 
larger environmental budget to intervene. Many mitigation and adaptation 
programmes reflect EU priorities and their benefits or impacts are cross-
border in nature. The EU budget should be able to function as a mechanism 
to finance projects that have a European added value beyond the territory 
in which they are implemented. Examples are listed for mitigation and 
adaptation, as well as environmental catastrophes, such as wildfires and 
flooding. It is crucial to build a better pan-European response capability. 
In the area of transport, the report highlights the necessity of 
speeding up the completion of the TEN rail and waterways systems, 
particularly for cargo, which demand greater budgetary intervention. 
Furthermore, to foster the switch to greener transport systems, it is 
recommended that member states introduce the Eurovignette to their 
motorway networks, using part of the revenues to develop greener 
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The agricultural sector will likewise have to play a role, although the 
capacity to reduce emissions in the EU is limited. Still, through better 
farming practices and novel land-management, important reductions in 
emissions may be achieved – even contributing to a considerable level of 
carbon capture. In some cases, it is possible to contemplate the sector’s 
integration into the Emissions Trading System (ETS) if it were able to sell 
emission credits.  
Climate change will in any case hit the agricultural sector hard, 
especially in areas affected by drought and flooding. The present policy 
needs to change the support system and channel funds to real actions better 
linked to the actual costs of practices. The role of the insurance sector has to 
be reassessed. Private insurance schemes could cover more variability, 
while public funding could offer guarantees for extreme cases that private 
insurers would not cover. 
On external action, the EU is underfunded in view of the increasing 
external challenges. For reasons of coherence and efficiency, it is 
recommended that climate change obligations be dealt with through a 
central budget. Initially, however, this element could be financed through a 
separate budget, as was the case for the European Development Fund in 
the past – especially if increases in expenditure are needed before the new 
Financial Perspectives, which is likely. It could later be incorporated into 
the EU budget or not. The external budget for climate actions could be 
funded by ETS revenues. 
The EU budget is financially a very limited instrument and it will 
likely remain strained. That is why the report calls for reinforcing the 
leverage principle of the budget. It should not be funding any policy 
entirely, which is the case of the CAP. The report calls for the introduction 
of co-financing for agricultural support, preferably with a solidarity 
mechanism, whereby rates would vary depending on the fiscal capacity of 
member states.  
Even with a smaller budget for agriculture, the limitations imposed 
on the budget severely constrain the EU’s ability to act decisively in large 
projects of EU-wide interest. The funding levels for TENs and research are 
too low to contribute significantly to the finalisation of TENs in transport 
and energy or to finance the large-scale demonstration and testing of 
technologies.  
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The green stimulus packages will eventually end and some 
mechanisms should be in place to maintain the momentum. It is for this 
purpose that the EU has to explore further the expansion of the budget into 
financial solutions, such as loan guarantees for funds from the EIB or the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, or even the 
possibility of allowing the EU to launch bonds to finance large projects of 
EU-wide interest.  
The report explains the role the EU budget and lists the ways it can 
contribute to achieving the climate objectives of the EU. Along with helping 
to accomplish emission reductions, the actions presented would greatly 
foster the creation of green jobs and the development of a knowledge 
economy. The EU would benefit from these actions, additionally enabling it 
to keep a leading edge in green technology, which in the future will be in 
high demand globally.  
A lukewarm integration of climate objectives in the budget and the 
continuation of a rather uninspiring set of budgetary actions will only 
damage the image of the EU institutions and send the wrong signal to EU 
citizens and international partners. It is time for a budget that confronts the 
multiple challenges ahead in a coherent fashion. Anything less will further 
erode the EU’s standing and legitimacy, and ultimately its capacity to lead 
on the climate agenda in the EU and beyond.  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
limate change is inevitable and is already happening – the effects of 
which are expected to be generated by the stock of greenhouse 
gasses (GHGs) currently in the atmosphere. How high the rises in 
temperature will climb and the extent of the ramifications over the years 
will depend on actions taken today to limit further emissions. Europe is 
expected to suffer less than most other parts of the world, but the effects 
will be negative on balance and concentrated in some of its poorest regions. 
The EU is a significant emitter of GHGs and has a high degree of 
historical responsibility for their present level in the atmosphere. As such, 
the EU has a duty to lead the reduction in emissions along with an 
obligation towards poorer countries to help them adapt to climate change 
and reduce their emissions. This obligation applies of course to all major 
emitters. The EU alone cannot make a susceptible difference, but may lead 
other countries by example and also benefit by developing and providing 
the necessary technologies. 
The actual impacts of climate change are shrouded in uncertainty but 
the latest research points towards two worrisome conclusions. It is unlikely 
that the world average rise in temperature will be limited to 2°C this 
century, while a rise of over 3-4°C seems likely with possibly serious 
climatological, ecological and socio-economic implications. Even if the EU 
is able to adapt to the changes, it will not be immune to the potentially 
large disruptions this will cause across the globe. Containing climate 
change to avoid the risk of catastrophic effects is thus imperative for all 
countries; a weak agreement in Copenhagen will not benefit anybody. Even 
if the climatic change itself is mild or positive for some (mostly in northern 
Europe), the indirect security concerns could have serious consequences for 
all. 
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The aim is that the EU, and indeed all countries, undergoes an energy 
revolution, transforming into low carbon economies that in time avoid 
catastrophic climate change. Commencing such a revolution is feasible 
even with existing technologies, later (e.g. by around 2030–50) 
complemented by new ones. The financial effort needs to be started now. 
Even then, there is a great likelihood of catastrophic events occurring.  
Some low-tech, fast actions could be implemented quickly, such as 
management of methane emissions from other human activities, 
particularly waste management. Methane is a powerful greenhouse gas 
and many sources could be tackled rapidly and cost effectively with 
today’s technologies. 
The EU budget is only a small component of the overall investment 
required; in fact, it is financially very limited to enable the EU to lead in the 
difficulties ahead. Yet, such funds have a very important part to play if 
used wisely. In agriculture, this is obvious because any adaptation and 
mitigation measures will have a direct effect on the budget for the common 
agricultural policy (CAP), but the EU budget is crucial for implementing 
policies in other areas. As a leverage instrument and through the strategic 
use of its funds, it can be a catalyst for change in the trans-European 
electricity grid and the completion of the single market in energy. 
Moreover, it can lead to a fundamental transformation of the energy and 
transport infrastructure in some EU member states and regions, especially 
those covered by infrastructural support through the cohesion policy.1 
Also, through an imaginative use of funds, for example by expanding 
the scope of the existing but limited financial mechanisms of the European 
Investment Bank (EIB), the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD) and other financial institutions, the EU budget has 
                                                      
1 There are three funds under the cohesion policy: the cohesion fund, the European 
R e g i o n a l  D e v e l o p m e n t  F u n d  ( E R D F )  a n d  t h e  E u r o p e a n  S o c i a l  F u n d  ( E S F ) .  T h e  
cohesion fund is for assistance to member states with an average GDP per capita 
below 90% of the EU average. It finances transport and environmental 
infrastructure at the national level. The ERDF and ESF are used to finance actions 
for regions under three objectives. Objective 1 is for convergence regions with a 
GDP per capita under 75% of the EU average. Objective 2 is assistance to other 
regions that face specific socio-economic difficulties and high unemployment. 
Objective 3 is for territorial cooperation, promoting it on a cross-border, 
transnational and interregional basis. FOR A FUTURE SUSTAINABLE, COMPETITIVE AND GREENER EU BUDGET | 11 
 
the ability to catalyse the funds and so multiply their size and influence. 
Many restrictions on the scope for using the EU budget are only based on 
bureaucratic and political operational methodologies.  
This report analyses the challenges that climate change poses for the 
EU and how the EU budget can help address them while taking into 
account its features and the principles that should govern a supranational 
budget. To do so, the report must first study what the budget provides for 
today on climate change and consider how it can be improved.  
Given the rapidly increasing dilemmas of climate change adaptation 
and mitigation, the role of the EU budget is no longer one of having some 
subheadings on climate change, but one of integrating this issue across all 
of its operations. Some specially dedicated funds for specific adaptation 
and mitigation purposes could be established, but their existence should 
not deflect from the need to make all budget operations coherent with 
climate objectives. The EU budget has to follow the Gothenburg agenda,2 
which was relegated to the shadows while the Lisbon agenda took centre 
stage. The Gothenburg agenda requires that environmental sustainability 
should be incorporated in all Community policies. All operations financed 
by the EU should require the highest environmental standards, especially 
concerning levels of emissions and climate protection. The EU institutions 
themselves should also be leading by example, introducing high standards 
in their own operations and procurement rules. 
This report gives a short overview of the major, direct impacts 
expected from climate change in Europe in chapter 2. Chapter 3 analyses 
the features of the EU budget and the rationale for it intervening in this 
area. These introductory chapters are followed by chapter 4, which 
presents the difficulties the EU faces and how the EU budget can assist. 
Chapter 5 focuses on the cohesion policy, owing to its central importance in 
many countries and regions. Chapter 6 gives a summary analysis of the 
recovery plan through the EU budget and the possible use of new financial 
instruments in the future. Chapter 7 presents the conclusions. 
                                                      
2 The Gothenburg agenda (arising from the European Council of June 2001) added 
a ‘third’ environmental pillar to the Lisbon agenda, requiring the integration of 
environmental protection into Community policies. The other two pillars created 
in the Lisbon agenda (from the European Council of March 2000) involve economic 
and social reforms to foster growth and employment.  
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2.  CLIMATE CHANGE IMPLICATIONS FOR 
THE EU 
he effects of climate change on Europe have been analysed by the 
European Commission (2009a, 2009b and 2009d). Even with the 
assumption that mitigation will be substantial, temperatures in 
various regions are expected to increase on average by over 4°C by the end 
of the century. The increases are particularly serious in the Mediterranean 
regions in the base scenario without mitigation (Figure 1).  
The rises in temperatures are expected to provoke more frequent 
coastal and river flooding and a recrudescence of droughts. Indeed, river 
flooding and incidences of drought in the last decade have already 
exceeded the averages in the past. The number of flood disasters between 
1990 and 1998 surpassed the average of the entire 1950–85 period (ibid.). 
Increases in temperatures of such magnitude in the Mediterranean 
basin are going to affect water resources and thus the environment. 
Desertification will speed up with considerable implications for agriculture, 
biodiversity and human living conditions in many regions.  
With the strain on water resources worsening in several parts of the 
world, migration pressures and risks of conflict are likely to be exacerbated. 
For Europe, growing water scarcity in neighbouring Mediterranean 
countries could pose social and security problems owing to greater 
migration pressures (compounded by possibly large migrations from Asia 
if the monsoon is disrupted). Another expected effect is an increasing risk 
of wildfires in the Mediterranean basin.  
The interesting aspect of the Commission’s study is that the 
cumulative impact of climate change on European regions is highest in 
many of the poorest of the EU (Figure 2), compounding their difficulties in 
achieving a level of welfare equivalent to the EU average.  
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Figure 1. Change in mean annual temperature by the end of this century 
 
Source: PESETA project (http://peseta.jrc.ec.europa.eu). The map reflects the absolute 
change in the mean annual temperature between the control periods 1961–90 and 2071-2100, 
under the IPCC SRES scenario A2. Data derived from the European Commission-funded 
PRUDENCE project (HadCM3 global circulation model, and HIRHAM regional climate 
model in 12km resolution). Map elaboration by the European Commission’s Joint Research 
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According to the Regions 2020 study of the European Commission 
(2009a), 170 million citizens of the EU live in the most vulnerable regions 
for the negative effects of climate change (based on a vulnerability index, as 
shown in Figure 2). 3 This index comprises the following elements:  
•  changes in the population affected by river flooding, 
•  the population in areas below 5m (with the threat of coastal erosion), 
•  potential drought hazards, and 
•  the vulnerability of fisheries, agriculture and tourism to changes in 
temperature and precipitation. 
While the risks of river flooding are not expected to be concentrated 
in particular regions of Europe, those from droughts will accumulate in the 
Mediterranean, as will coastal risks in the northern Atlantic regions. 
Significant effects from droughts are forecasted in many important 
agricultural regions and disproportionately in poorer ones. For the entire 
Mediterranean area, the damages from climate change are expected to have 
major consequences for the economies of the region, with serious socio-
economic repercussions. 
                                                      
3 The list is derived from the presentation in the Task Force by Peter Berkovitz, on 
“The Climate Change Challenge for Cohesion Policy”, 28 April 2009. According to 
the European Commission (2009b, p. 23), 
[t]he index is an average of normalized indicators of vulnerability of areas 
to drought, change in population affected by 100 year return river floods 
under the A2 scenario, exposure of the agriculture, fisheries and tourism 
sector[s] to climate change expressed by [a] proportion of these sectors in 
regional GVA in regions where these sectors will be negatively affected, 
and exposure of densely populated areas to coastal erosion expressed in 
coastal populations living below [the] 5m elevation. The methodology has 
entailed that all impacts are weighted equally, despite the fact that these 
impacts will incur different costs. Implicit in the calculation of the index is 
also that it does not account for positive effects of climate change in some 
regions, and does not consider how effects of climate change will be 
dampened by adaptation activities. In addition, indicators for some 
significant expected impacts have not been included due to a lack of 
information, e.g. effects of climate change on mountainous areas, health 
effects and ecological effects. Due to these shortcomings the index should 
not be used to compare impacts between regions, rather should be seen as 
a demonstration of the fact that the impacts of climate change will vary 
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Figure 2. Climate-change vulnerability index 
 
Source: European Commission (2009a), p. 7. 16 | CLIMATE CHANGE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE EU 
 
Although the average impact on GDP is small by 2020 if changes are 
gradual (from 0.7 to -0.7% for all member states, taking into account the 
effects of climate change and the EU’s recently adopted climate package, 
according to Berkowitz, 2009), the estimated impact on some regional 
economies is significant.  
The magnitude of the economic consequences will depend on the 
sectoral composition of the regions affected. Weather-sensitive sectors will 
be hit by climatic changes, i.e. agriculture, fisheries, forestry, tourism and 
energy. In addition, climate changes will bring new health problems caused 
by the spread of pathogens, pests and recurring heat waves. Of course, 
some regions will benefit, but overall the negative effects are expected to 
outweigh the positive ones.  
The challenges and ramifications are so large that mitigation and 
adaptation need to be integrated horizontally across all policies at the EU 
and national levels. For the EU budget to play a constructive role in 
addressing the challenges ahead, more will be required than changing 
some budget lines at the margin. 
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3.  IS THERE A ROLE FOR A CENTRALISED 
FINANCIAL EFFORT BY THE EU? 
s outlined in chapter 2, Europe will be affected by climate change 
directly and indirectly. The severity of the associated impacts will 
depend on the global efforts to curb emissions, the geographical 
incidence of climate effects and the sectoral composition of the economy in 
the affected areas. This chapter explores the extent to which the EU budget 
should intervene given the repercussions discussed earlier. 
The role of the EU is primarily regulatory, but there are areas in 
which there are specific cases for EU-level financial allocations: 
a)  Assistance and compensation for mitigation and adaptation operations with 
important transboundary costs and benefits. This relates to the reasoning 
applied to a typical case of environmental damage caused by 
transboundary pollution, where the source of the pollution and 
consequences are not the same. In the case of GHG emissions (while 
not formally pollutants), there are strong parallels, as the source of 
the emissions and the location and gravity of the impacts are 
unrelated. Thus, there is a case for allocated funds from the EU’s 
‘supranational’ budget either to compensate the regions affected with 
funds extracted from the polluters (the polluter pays principle) or to 
assist regions that will face costs in mitigation or adaptation with the 
support of other regions that will benefit from their actions.  
b)  Economies of scale. At the EU level, it is possible to allocate funds more 
efficiently in areas where emission reduction measures and 
adaptation actions are most successful.  
c)  Support for R&D. Owing to its public good nature across the EU and 
the potentially sizeable economies of scale of coordinated action, 
R&D is generally considered a standard case for EU-level financial 
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support. The EU budget can finance the work based on excellence 
criteria regardless of its location. Furthermore, EU coordination of 
R&D activities can feed into policy-making, ensuring a coherent EU 
strategy and benefitting from the economies of scale generated by 
pooling the research of various institutes across the EU. 
d)  Leverage action. The EU budget is an important instrument for 
fostering climate-related objectives through its leverage action, for 
promoting the implementation of best practices, for R&D, for 
supporting the testing, deployment and use of technologies, and for 
the construction of infrastructure, chiefly in regions with limited 
resources.  
e)  Cross-border and pan-European infrastructure. The EU can provide a 
necessary incentive for the development of such infrastructure, 
where the benefits for the EU are larger compared with the benefits 
for the individual member state or region in which it is located. The 
importance of political commitments and financial assistance has 
been proven for the trans-European networks (TENs); of particular 
relevance in this respect are the electricity, gas and rail connections. 
Arguing for the need of EU funds for climate action is thus relatively 
straightforward; fitting this into the political realities of the EU budget is 
not. It is also important to keep in mind that the EU is a partner in the UN-
led global action through which commitments are being negotiated, and in 
relation to global emissions, its budget is of course not a perfect instrument. 
It cannot compensate for the impacts of emissions from non-EU countries, 
nor can it fully compensate non-EU countries for the effects of EU 
emissions. But for the EU, its budget is the best existing, international 
financial instrument available.  
3.1  The present budget needs and realities 
Although there is little doubt of the benefits of a common EU budget to 
help implement specific policies related to climate change, it is unclear 
whether or how much funding should be channelled through the EU 
budget. Consequently, and not surprisingly, the choices of the financial 
instruments used will be influenced by the limitations of the budget.  
As the EU budget developed, equity considerations were central: 
income discrepancies among sectors were addressed through the CAP 
while disparities in average incomes among nations and regions were 
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concerns are reflected in the current EU budget, which is clearly dominated 
by the agricultural and cohesion policies.  
Their structure, however, has been influenced by the need in the past 
to ensure that member states agree on two fundamental developments in 
the EU – the single market and monetary union. Both can be interpreted as 
compensation for the perceived effects of integration in member states. 
Their “compensatory nature” is perfectly understandable in the context of a 
multinational agreement, and the net balance disputes originating from 
these policies fit well the game-theoretic models based on political power 
(Kauppi and Widgren, 2005). 
Still, the single market has grosso modo been completed while 
monetary union has been achieved among a large number of member 
states. The agricultural sector has also changed profoundly. Despite 
subsequent reforms of the CAP, there still seems to be a gap between the 
policy structure and the needs of the sector.  
Meanwhile, the objectives of the EU have increased in number: 
globalisation pressures are challenging the EU’s competitiveness in world 
markets; external developments have required member states to take joint 
positions  vis-à-vis non-EU countries in areas beyond trade; and finally, 
climate change is pressing the EU to pool and coordinate energy resources 
and collaborate more closely in various fields. 
Unfortunately, the CAP and cohesion policy take up 80% of the 
budget (Figure 3), which is limited by a rather strict ceiling of 1.24% of EU 
gross national income (GNI). Given the pre-allocated nature of these two 
policies, by either the amount of agricultural land or the GDP per capita of 
regions, the budget has been dominated by net balance considerations. An 
integration of further objectives and costs that affect the net balances is 
difficult, especially for funding that is not pre-allocated by region. As a 
result, new objectives in the budget receive little funding, or the old policies 
are ‘retrofitted’ to integrate some new concerns. The problem with these 
approaches is that in both cases we are often far from a ‘first best’ solution. 
For climate actions in particular, there are clear benefits from action at the 
EU level if the distribution of resources is focused where most efficient and 
is not pre-allocated. 
The consequences of pre-allocated funding that is based on net 
balance considerations rather than on needs are expressed by the Sapir 
report (2003) in one sentence: [The EU budget is a] “historic relic ... 
inconsistent with the present and future state of EU integration” (p. 162). 20 | IS THERE A ROLE FOR A CENTRALISED FINANCIAL EFFORT BY THE EU? 
 
The budget policies and their allocation suffer from what many have 
termed ‘Eurosclerosis’. Hence, important EU policies aimed at growth, 
external action, security and home affairs are underfunded.4  
Figure 3. EU budget composition, Financial Perspectives for 2007–13 
 
Source: Núñez Ferrer (2007a, p. 7) Calculations based on the Interinstitutional 
Agreement between the European Parliament, the Council and the 
Commission on budgetary discipline and sound financial management, OJ 
C 139/01, 14.06.2006. 
Not surprisingly, on climate change, the present budget does not 
address the needs, as numerous studies have made clear.5 
Some efforts are being undertaken, such as the recent shifts in the 
priorities of national strategies for the structural funds,6 newly adopted 
changes in the investment rules of the European Regional Development 
                                                      
4 A description of the underlying factors is presented in Núñez Ferrer (2007a and 
2007b). 
5 See Egenhofer et al. (2008), CEE Bankwatch and Friends of the Earth (2007), 
Mabey et al. (2008) and Adelle et al. (2008). 
6 See European Commission (2009g).  
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Fund (ERDF) for energy efficiency in buildings and the funding for energy 
in the recovery plan.7 But these do not sum up to solve the large 
weaknesses of the budget in this area. 
From the standpoint of the amount of resources, for the EU to finance 
new climate objectives sufficiently, it must consider either allowing the 
budget to increase or reducing the expenditure under some present 
headings. Of course, both the regional and agricultural policies can be 
altered to contribute to cutting emissions and adapting to climate change, 
but this is a prerequisite in any case and it does not substitute for the need 
to rethink, in depth, the finances and the structure of the budget. 
3.2  Limitations and potential of the EU budget  
Using the EU budget not only offers opportunities, but also faces specific 
limitations that are unlikely to change in the coming decades, and these 
need to be clearly stated to better focus the discussion. Furthermore, 
interventions from the EU budget do not occur in an isolated context, 
which offers possibilities for enhancing their efficiency through better 
coordination and integration with national policies. The main points to be 
taken into account are outlined below. 
1.  The EU budget does not operate in isolation. The EU budget should 
be considered an additional fiscal and budgetary resource in the EU. 
As such, it should not be financing entire policies independent of 
national action. It is the sum of the national and EU actions that will 
determine the quality of the interventions. 
2.  Coherence between EU and national actions is paramount. 
Furthermore, actions at the EU level should be additional and 
enhance national actions. 
3.  The EU budget is limited. Even if it increases, it is unlikely to be able 
to fund entire policy areas efficiently.  
4.  The EU budget has four natural roles it can play: 
a.  Solidarity.  The EU budget is the best existing financial 
instrument for solidarity among EU member states.8 The 
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potential to mitigate climate change and the need to adapt may 
be highest in countries with low budgetary resources. Support 
through the EU budget may be an effective way to ensure 
important investments are undertaken where they would not 
have occurred otherwise. Where large transboundary benefits 
are expected, the EU budget can act as a mechanism to ensure 
appropriate burden sharing among beneficiaries. 
b.  Guidance. The EU budget can be used as an incentive for 
attracting investment into specific areas through its leverage 
instruments. Where important EU priorities are unlikely to be 
funded locally, because the EU-wide benefits are greater than 
the local ones, EU assistance is a powerful tool to attract the 
necessary investments. Trans-European energy and rail 
infrastructure, R&D or environmental actions with cross-border 
impacts, are such cases. Conditionalities for funds offered for 
poorer regions to develop could be an effective way to 
influence national and regional development strategies.  
c.  Loan guarantees. The use of some of the EU budget to increase 
the loan guarantee funds of the EIB could represent a highly 
effective instrument for releasing loans to the private sector for 
more risky venture-capital investments or large, complex, 
longer-term projects. Loan guarantees are already used for 
example, for the European Investment Fund of the EIB. It has 
been recorded that participation of the EIB in projects has 
assisted in attracting venture capital from other private 
financial institutions. The scope to expand into such 
instruments is large, but it would require further re-evaluation 
of the EU budget’s role, which is still very much based on a 
grant/subsidy mentality.  
d.  Coordinated external action. Generally, the use of centrally 
coordinated action for foreign assistance is theoretically 
considered more efficient than having each member state run 
                                                                                                                                       
8 The Emissions Trading System also incorporates solidarity through 
differentiation in effort sharing among member states, but it is not an EU 
budgetary instrument, as revenues do not accrue to the EU. FOR A FUTURE SUSTAINABLE, COMPETITIVE AND GREENER EU BUDGET | 23 
 
separate programmes.9 Funding for development actions 
abroad, which should be compatible with adaptation and 
mitigation objectives, could be better served by a common EU 
instrument. A single voice from the EU within international 
institutions – backed by a single powerful instrument – would 
strengthen the negotiating position of the EU, helping it to 
promote its visions on climate action and development. It 
would also increase the EU’s visibility and make it more 
accountable. National programmes, even using common 
criteria, face higher risks of overlapping and encountering 
coordination problems. 
3.3  Fundamental rules of the EU budget 
Increasing the budget to fight climate change is not enough; the targets for 
the funds are as important as the level of funding. These targets are guided 
by principles that are enshrined in the EU treaties, financial rules and 
regulations: 
•  Subsidiarity. The EU should only act when it is better suited to do so 
when compared with lower levels of governance.  
•  Proportionality. According to EU law, the EU may only act to exactly 
the extent needed to achieve its objectives and no further. Implicit in 
this principle, actions should be value for money and provide European 
added value. 
•  Additionality. This rule, which is applied to cohesion policy and rural 
interventions, states that EU aid should not substitute for national 
funding that would have been disbursed in the absence of EU 
intervention, nor should EU funding reduce aggregate national 
public spending. This rule should apply in general, unless EU 
member states pool all national financial resources for a policy, e.g. 
the CAP. 
                                                      
9 This reasoning follows the theories of fiscal federalism, which analyse the best 
level of governance for certain policies. There are often criticisms that external aid 
programmes are uncoordinated and that national aid agencies are competing 
rather than collaborating in the same crisis areas.  
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4.  MAJOR CHALLENGES FOR THE EU AND 
THE ROLE OF THE EU BUDGET 
iscussions on the EU budget tend, understandably, to become 
entrenched in the actual policies and headings of the budget. This 
can be useful when discussing alterations to particular policies, but 
constrains change. The opposite is also true: handling the budget 
completely in isolation of its composition produces abstract policy 
recommendations with little guidance for realistic reforms. This report 
attempts to find a balance that allows both – discussing the functions of the 
budget openly and providing specific recommendations for actual policies. 
Doing so, however, requires the analysis to be based on a discussion of 
seven important areas in which EU intervention is crucial, with possibly 
significant budgetary implications: 
•  the fundamentally changing nature of energy supply and demand in 
the EU, 
•  support for R&D and technology demonstration, 
•  a rethinking of the role of the agricultural policy, 
•  reductions to emissions from transport, 
•  improvements to environmental sustainability and the management 
of ecosystems, 
•  support for climate actions generating EU-wide benefits, and 
•  help for developing countries in mitigation and adaptation efforts. 
Under these headings, this chapter concentrates on objectives and 
links them to the structure of the EU budget. It then specifically 
recommends the necessary changes in the budget to achieve them, taking 
into account the limitations of the budget as described earlier. Some of the 
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recommendations are presented in chapter 5 on cohesion policy. Because of 
its complexity, this policy is analysed in more detail as a separate budget. 
4.1  The fundamentally changing nature of energy supply and 
demand in the EU 
Given that energy-related emissions account for about 80% of all GHG 
emissions in the EU (EEA, 2009), energy is the single most important item 
for mitigation (the 10,000 installations covered by the Emissions Trading 
System (ETS) by themselves produce half the CO2 and 40% of total GHG 
emissions).10 The power sector is central to the mitigation efforts. In the EU, 
over 50% of the electricity generated in power stations relies on fossil fuels. 
In transport, a shift to rail and fluvial transport and the use of biofuels, 
electric motors and hydrogen can reduce CO2, but at the same time, rail and 
the spread of electric and hydrogen cars will increase the demands on the 
power sector. Moreover, the next 20 years will require some 600 GWe11 of 
new power generation capacity to accommodate the growth of demand 
and to replace ageing plants. This equals the current installed capacity. 
Meanwhile, substantial financial investment is also needed for grids to 
replace ageing infrastructure.  
The challenge for the power sector is significant. According to the 
model results of the International Energy Agency (IEA) (2009) on how to 
limit the concentration of CO2 at 450 ppm (parts per million),12 the effort 
required for the power generation sector until 2020 is considerable and 
higher than for other energy users. Globally, to reduce emissions from 
energy use from 28.8 Gt13 to 26.4 Gt by 2030 (compared with a reference 
trend of 40.2 Gt by 2030), the power sector would have to reduce emissions 
by 3.4 Gt, thus more than offsetting the rise in emissions in other areas. For 
                                                      
10 See the Questions and Answers on the Commission’s proposal to revise the EU 
ETS in European Commission (2008d). 
11 GWe refers to gigawatt electric. 
12 Note that 450 ppm is the level at which, according to climatologists, there is a 
50% chance of temperatures rising above 2°C – a level after which there is a high 
risk of catastrophic effects. 
13 Gt refers to gigatonne. 26 | MAJOR CHALLENGES FOR THE EU AND THE ROLE OF THE EU BUDGET 
 
the OECD+,14 the required fall is vital, and given the higher share of 
emissions from the power sector than in non-OECD countries, it is 
proportionally higher. The total emissions reduction required is 5.4 Gt from 
today’s 13.1. To achieve this, a cut of 3.5 Gt will have to be achieved by the 
power generation sector (a fall of 66%), which is greater than the global, 
total emissions reduction.  
For the EU, the required reduction in total emissions is from 3.9 Gt to 
2.3 Gt, with 68% of the fall coming from power generation (see Figure 4).  
Figure 4. EU energy-related CO2 emissions 
 
Source: IEA (2009), Figure 17. 
The most important intervention of the EU has been the formal 
adoption of the energy and climate change package on 6 April 2009. This 
package intends to achieve the EU’s overall, binding environmental targets, 
which were adopted by the EU heads of state and government at their 8-9 
March 2007 summit (Council of the European Union, 2007). They 
committed to unilaterally reducing GHG emissions by 20% compared with 
1990 levels by 2020 (and up to 30% if other developed countries commit to 
comparable emissions reductions) and to increase the share of renewable 
                                                      
14 OECD+ represents all OECD countries plus the EU member states that are not 
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energy in the EU’s total energy consumption to 20%. While these two 
targets are binding, they also initially set a non-binding energy-efficiency 
goal of reducing primary energy consumption by 20% by 2020 compared 
with base projections – an objective that seems to have been dropped and 
subsequently substituted by a 20% increase in the energy efficiency target, 
which says nothing about consumption. The package adopted consists of a 
number of directives (see Box 1), regulating the elements set out below. 
Emission targets. A binding absolute target for the reduction of 
emissions has been agreed, which includes a “firm independent 
commitment” by all the 27 EU member states to reduce their emissions 
unilaterally by 20% below 1990 levels by 2020. The package also establishes 
a more ambitious reduction target of 30% below 1990 levels by 2020 
provided there is a global agreement, i.e. developed countries commit to 
“comparable emission reductions” and advanced developing countries 
agree to “contribut[e] adequately”. The unilateral 20% target will be met by 
strengthening the EU ETS to reduce emissions by 21% below 2005 levels in 
the sectors covered, and cut emissions by 10% in all other non-ETS sectors, 
including waste, transportation and buildings, through EU-wide and 
member state policies. To allow flexibility for member states to meet the 
10% target in the non-ETS sectors, member states can make use of their 
national policies, credits related to the clean development mechanism 
(CDM)15 of the UNFCCC,16 bank any excess reductions and trade among 
themselves.  
Renewables target. A binding target of 20% of renewable energy 
sources in the EU’s final consumption of energy by 2020 has been adopted, 
which includes a binding minimum 10% share of biofuels and other 
renewable transportation fuels in each member state’s transport energy 
consumption by 2020.  
                                                      
15 The CDM is a system through which emitters can obtain emission reduction 
credits through projects outside the EU. While theoretically, one can consider that a 
reduction abroad is equivalent to a domestic reduction for a global emission, in 
practice the projects financed have been criticised as having a very dubious 
emission reduction effect, sometimes even increasing emissions. 
16 UNFCCC refers to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
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Energy-efficiency goal. A non-binding energy-efficiency goal was also 
included at the outset, of reducing primary energy consumption by 20% by 
2020 compared with projections. Yet this objective seems to have been 
replaced by the objective to increase energy efficiency by 20% by 2020, 
which is not the same thing. A draft Commission Communication on 
Energy Efficiency published by EurActiv17 clearly states that the energy 
consumption objective will not be met. Under the best scenario, only an 
11% fall can be achieved. The new objective, however, is very controversial, 
as it is wide open to ‘rebound effects’ – by which savings achieved from 
energy efficiency can change behaviour towards increasing consumption. 
Rebound effects can strongly diminish the impact of efficiency gains, by 
50% worldwide according to Barker et al. (2009). 
Carbon capture and storage goal. A commitment to invest in the 
construction of up to 12 large-scale power plants using carbon capture and 
storage (CCS) technology has been agreed, as well as a legal framework for 
CCS. A new directive has been adopted that sets up an EU-wide regulatory 
framework for CCS. While it remains up to member states whether they 
want to deploy this technology, the directive ensures harmonised 
conditions for the assessment of storage sites, for authorisation procedures 
and for the closure of such sites. 
Vehicular emissions performance standard. A stringent emissions 
performance standard of 120g CO2/km for all new cars by 2015 is another 
target. In 2012, this objective will become binding for 65% of a given 
manufacturer’s car fleet, in 2013 for 75% and in 2014 for 80%. As of 2015, 
the entire fleet will be required to meet the emissions limit. 
Fuel quality standards. The revised fuel-quality directive aims at 
improving air quality and reducing GHG emissions through environmental 
standards for fuel. It seeks to facilitate the blending of biofuels into petrol 
and diesel, which will need to meet sustainability criteria corresponding to 
those of the renewables directive. The directive sets a target for fuel 
suppliers to reduce GHG emissions from fuels by 6% over their complete 
lifecycle by 2020. Mixing biofuels with petrol and diesel as well as 
improving production technology in refineries will be the main strategies 
to achieve this.  
                                                      
17 For further information about the Communication, see the EurActiv.com website 
link http://www.euractiv.com/pdf/Draft_COM_IS_Oct2009-1%5B1%5D.pdf). FOR A FUTURE SUSTAINABLE, COMPETITIVE AND GREENER EU BUDGET | 29 
 
 
 
Still, these directives alone are not enough to ensure the industrial 
revolution required in the medium to long term, which must be driven by 
innovation and a fundamental change, not only in the way energy is 
produced, but also in how it is consumed. Prior to this package, the EU had 
already published the Strategic Energy Technology (SET) Plan (European 
Commission 2007a), presenting a roadmap for strengthening the research, 
development and demonstration of new technologies relevant for 
addressing climate change. This document has recently been 
complemented by a more detailed action plan (European Commission, 
2009e).  
Box 1. Directives making up the EU’s energy and climate change package 
The package consists of the following directives:  
•  Directive of 26 March 2009 amending Directive 2003/87/EC so as to 
improve and extend the greenhouse gas emission allowance trading 
scheme of the Community, PE-CONS 3737/08; 
•  Directive of 26 March 2009 on the promotion of the use of energy from 
renewable sources amending and subsequently repealing Directives 
2001/77/EC and 2003/30/EC, PE-CONS 3736/08; 
•  Directive of 26 March 2009 on the effort of Member States to reduce 
their greenhouse gas emissions to meet the Community’s greenhouse 
gas emission reduction commitments up to 2020, PE-CONS 3738/08;  
•  Directive of 25 March 2009 setting emission performance standards for 
new passenger cars as part of the Community’s integrated approach to 
reduce CO2 emissions from light-duty vehicles, PE-CONS 3741/08;  
•  Directive of 27 March 2009 as regards the specification of petrol, diesel 
and gas-oil and introducing a mechanism to monitor and reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions and amending Council Directive 
1999/32/EC as regards the specification of fuel used by inland 
waterway vessels and repealing Directive 93/12/EEC, PE-CONS 
3740/1/08; and  
•  Directive of 26 March on the geological storage of carbon dioxide and 
amending Council Directive 85/337/EEC, Directives 2000/60/EC, 
2001/80/EC, 2004/35/EC, 2006/12/EC, 2008/1/EC and Regulation 
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Some aspects of the EU approach have raised concerns, including the 
low price of carbon in the ETS, which reduces its impact. Also, the 
provisions allowing the offsetting of reductions through the CDM have 
been questioned by the WWF,18 which warns that they may potentially 
reduce actual emission cuts. Nevertheless, while the allocation of permits 
and the carbon price of the ETS might have been softened, the binding 
targets to reduce GHGs are still important and stringent for the energy 
sector.  
Shifting away from fossil fuels poses issues that are very often 
misunderstood or underestimated. MacKay’s (2008) book on meeting 
energy needs with renewables and increasing energy efficiency in the UK 
clearly points out that the energy consumed today is far too high to believe 
that renewable sources at the national level or basic energy-saving 
investments will do the trick. Just to put it in figures, in the EU, 29% of the 
electricity production is generated from coal, 4% from oil, 20% from gas 
and another 30% from nuclear power stations. In other words, this means 
that the ‘non-renewable’ production of electricity covers 83% of the power 
supply (2006 figures, Eurostat).  
Longer term, limiting global warming to 2ºC above pre-industrial 
levels – a level below which EU policy-makers believe that irreversible 
ecological damage may still be avoided – will require cuts in global 
emissions of at least 50% by 2050 relative to 1990 levels (European 
Commission, 2007b). This figure may well be far too optimistic according to 
climate scientists, with 70-80% being a more realistic requirement (MacKay, 
2008). Those who claim that the energy solution can be found in a narrow 
band of technologies, in either renewables, nuclear or carbon capture, 
generally do not realise the complexities of the challenge ahead – 
technological as well as political and socio-economic. All technologies will 
have to play a role on a large scale. There is space for all players, but it 
requires fundamental developments for which the EU is essential, 
particularly as a regulator but in some cases as a finance provider (through 
the cohesion funds for poorer member states, for developing countries 
through the external action package and through the financial and fiscal 
mechanisms such as the ETS).  
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W e  n e e d  t o  m a t c h  e n e r g y  s u p p l y  w i t h  d e m a n d  w h i l e  q u i c k l y  
decarbonising. This requires a mixed basket of technologies, taking into 
account that renewables face severe constraints in deployment and that it is 
unlikely that energy efficiency will reduce the demand for energy from the 
power sector. Worldwide, the International Energy Outlook of 200919 by the 
US Energy Information Administration (EIA) shows an average growth of 
electricity demand of over 2.5% a year until 2030. For the EU, an annual 
increase in demand of around 1% is still predicted, while potentially large 
shifts in transport from fossil fuels to electricity and hydrogen would 
require a further increase in electric power generation. Energy efficiency on 
the demand side is still important to cushion this growth, but efficiency 
and decarbonisation on the supply side will be crucial. The power sector 
faces a dual challenge – decarbonising while increasing power. Even if the 
demand side becomes more energy efficient, many of the shifts away from 
fossil fuels, particularly for transport, will be towards the use of electric 
power. 
This challenge is indeed a very serious one. The average energy 
consumption of an EU citizen is 125 kWh/d per person (the total, mixed 
EU energy-consumption divided per person). Taking the example of solar 
power, which in theory could cover all our demand needs, we find that to 
cover just 50 kWh/d from photovoltaic (PV) sources in sunny 
Mediterranean areas (less than half of demand), would require 400 times 
the entire present, global, solar-panel capacity.20 Assuming high-efficiency 
panels at the present cost of implementation, this could be very expensive. 
Of course, the costs should fall with large-scale use, and technologies such 
as solar towers could greatly improve the power yield. The point 
nonetheless is that there are clearly no simple solutions.  
On the cost savings from large-scale use, the  IEA,21 for example, 
makes the case that renewables (except wind) experience significant capital 
                                                      
19 See “International Electricity Analysis” in EIA (2009) (retrieved from 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/ieo/pdf/electricity.pdf). 
20 This is based on MacKay’s (2008) assertion that to cover the same demand in the 
UK, the solar panels needed would exceed the globally deployed photovoltaics by 
100 times. The population of the EU is close to 10 times that of the UK, while 
photovoltaics produce around twice the energy in the Mediterranean regions, 
leading to this inaccurate but rather large estimate. 
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cost savings for each doubling of capacity, such as 15-20% for PVs and 20% 
for solar water heaters. This justifies proactive support policies for low 
carbon technologies, but we need to avoid glorifying any single energy 
source.  
Of course, the EU budget does not have the resources to handle the 
funding needs for deploying new energy sources, nor should this be its 
primary role. But the EU has to lay the foundations that will trigger the 
fundamental changes required to achieve a low carbon economy, and in 
this regard, budgetary resources can provide vital support through the 
guidance role they exert in leverage instruments, more specifically by 
a)  supporting R&D in this area and financing the demonstration of 
technologies; 
b)  assisting the development of the trans-European energy networks 
(TEN-E); and 
c)  helping poorer regions and countries to invest in clean energy 
systems and energy efficiency, in line with its solidarity role. 
Energy security across the EU with a large renewables sector requires 
the completion of a proper, single energy market, with a trans-European 
energy grid. In closed regions, without cross-border energy flows, energy 
sources compete for a reduced local market and fluctuations in energy from 
renewables require a high level of backup in power production capacity 
(see Ummels, 2009, on wind power). This limits the attractiveness of the 
deployment of large-scale renewable energy sources. This problem can be 
resolved largely by linking the EU regional power structures to high-
voltage direct current (HVDC) lines, which allow long distance energy 
transportation with little loss.  
The necessity of the energy network being able to adapt to the energy 
fluctuations and to respond quickly also calls for a rethink of the grids. A 
promising proposal is the deployment of smart grids, i.e. an intelligent 
energy system. These optimise energy consumption by de facto controlling 
the use of energy of private appliances. This is not an issue for the EU 
budget and public funds, but rather a regulatory one – in a free energy 
market the ownership and control of the metering devices needs to be 
regulated. At the same time, the EU would need directives that ensure that 
the introduction of large-scale, energy-efficient technologies is not 
hampered by regulatory barriers. The financial side may also be important 
in new member states and for large-scale demonstrations. FOR A FUTURE SUSTAINABLE, COMPETITIVE AND GREENER EU BUDGET | 33 
 
A network of HVDCs could be a fundamental step in the realisation 
of the single EU energy market, and a strong element for energy security 
and supply stability among EU member states. It would form the basis of a 
real energy revolution regardless of the kinds of energy sources present 
and the actual level of deployment of smart grids. EU financial support to 
set the basic infrastructure for an EU-wide HVDC network may be 
necessary. Without EU intervention and some burden sharing, some 
member states do not have the incentives to participate in the development 
of interconnectivity, as the benefits are not spread equally among member 
states. The European Commission’s (DG Competition) enquiry into the 
energy market (2008a) and many other energy sector studies22 have 
pinpointed the difficulties of creating a genuinely integrated energy 
market. 
The EU fund for TEN-E provides some support, but for the moment it 
is quite limited. It was not developed to address today’s energy concerns, 
as the Second Energy Review clearly states (European Commission, 2008b), 
and we are far from a coherent development of an integrated grid. 
Therefore, a potential role of the EU budget is to ensure that the necessary 
trans-European infrastructure is fostered to realise the single energy 
market. The use of HVDC lines for cross-connectivity could be a principal 
stepping stone, as these enable maximal use of renewable resources where 
more efficient. 
Frontrunners in the deployment of an integrated energy market with 
a strong renewable-energy element are the Nordic countries. These 
countries have developed sufficient cross-border capacity to consider this a 
real electricity exchange market, in which energy is traded freely in the 
‘Nord Pool exchange’ (for a comprehensive review, see MVV Consulting, 
2007). 
On the smart grids, while the financing of these grids will primarily 
fall into the hands of private operators, major opportunities to upgrade 
national networks in this direction in the new member states have to be 
grasped. Some new member states have obsolete and highly inefficient 
networks. Investments made today in the energy grids could fix the 
                                                      
22 See for example, Attiyas and Núñéz Ferrer (2008), Durant (2006), Egenhofer and 
Gialoglou (2006), Jamasb and Pollitt (2005), CPB (2006) or the national reports of 
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infrastructure for decades. The ETS allows exemptions from auctioning for 
the new member states if the associated revenues are invested in upgrades, 
but a fundamental upgrade requires appropriate integrated strategies that 
could be fostered by the EU (as discussed in chapter 5 on the cohesion 
policy). Mistakes will be costly. The EU is in a privileged position to offer 
co-financing and technical expertise to upgrade the grids to the latest 
specifications in line with the future needs of HVDC lines and smart energy 
grids.  
The ability of the EU to achieve emission targets through renewable 
energy or still-unproven carbon capture methods is questionable. Energy 
efficiency thus seems a central tool for the EU to reduce emissions on both 
the supply and demand sides. Energy efficiency is now subject to a non-
binding objective of a 20% increase in efficiency by 2020, but attainment 
would be more likely with the use of binding targets, especially to avoid 
the strong rebound effects mentioned earlier. Regulations and the carbon 
price levels will be determinants, additionally promoting the increasing 
efficiency of power generation from fossil fuels. Feed-in tariffs should also 
be introduced across the EU to promote the installation of renewables. On 
the demand side, energy efficiency is primarily a pricing and regulatory 
issue, such as the existence of building codes, with some national public 
support and EU assistance through the cohesion and rural development 
policies.  
Fiscal incentives (positive and negative) for energy efficiency remain 
mainly a national competence. The EU will have some sway by using and 
expanding the ETS, encouraging emission reductions and so fostering 
energy efficiency. Some limited form of carbon taxation linked to the EU 
budget revenues could be considered, as proposed by the Commission in 
its own resources report of 2004 (European Commission, 2004).  
Where the role of the EU budget is central is in increasing the energy-
efficiency conditionalities for the projects it funds, in the cohesion and 
structural funds, or for investment in farms and the food industry. The 
climate ‘proofing’23 of EU-funded projects is a minimum requirement. In 
                                                      
23 The term ‘climate-proofing’ is generally used for adaptation. Here it refers to the 
need to ensure that all measures integrate the best practices available, such as those 
concerning energy efficiency in infrastructure built with EU funds, preservation as 
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this respect, public procurement rules are crucial, as they have an influence 
on the general adoption of technologies. For instance, they are particularly 
important in the support for housing, as integrated into the budget. 
Housing in many parts of the new member states needs expansive new 
developments. Energy efficiency in building is a major emission reduction 
strategy, and a failure to use the best energy-saving building systems 
would amount to a large policy blunder given the low turnover rate of 1 to 
1.5% p.a. in the EU. The same should of course apply to commercial 
buildings. 
Alongside EU interventions, member states could introduce a fund to 
facilitate the implementation of profitable energy-saving projects in 
households, industry and the public sector, with the objective of identifying 
the most cost-effective savings in these sectors, looking at all phases from 
energy production to end use. The fund would provide loans for 
supporting, in the best way possible, the collective actions taken by each 
member state to meet the individual targets set out in the 2020 compromise.  
Such a fund could complement other sources of finance. For example, 
it could be used in collaboration with the EIB and similar lending 
institutions or provide the capital necessary to co-finance structural fund 
projects to support the proactive energy savings identified. The fund 
should be able to include provision of advice on how to access means of 
financing for relevant projects. Financing from state-owned lending 
institutions and the greater use of structural funds are vital for 
guaranteeing the implementation of needed energy-saving projects during 
this time of restricted access to capital in private investment markets.  
A similar scheme by the EU already exists for investments in the 
sustainable development of cities (JESSICA, the Joint European Support for 
Sustainable Investment in City Areas). This scheme allows structural funds 
to be converted into equity, loans or guarantees for investments in 
sustainable urban projects. The energy fund would not be part of the 
structural funds, but be a national element to accompany other efforts to 
achieve the energy efficiency objectives of the EU. 
                                                                                                                                       
part of environmental actions and even concerns about long-term impacts in ex 
ante impact evaluations of infrastructure (e.g. the effect of higher temperatures on 
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Chapter 5, dedicated to the cohesion policy, elucidates how this 
important budgetary mechanism could be adapted to complement the 
efforts for mitigation. 
 
 
4.2  Supporting R&D and demonstration 
The EU budget support for R&D is limited and its contribution to 
innovation is difficult to measure. For example, the EU framework 
programme corresponds to a mere 3% of EU R&D and thus the impact is 
hardly quantifiable. It seems clear that the EU has helped in increasing 
collaboration among research institutes across Europe, but it is less clear 
how the EU can contribute markedly to the development of technologies. 
The level of public and private research funding on energy across the 
EU is a real concern. It is important to realise that the share of R&D funding 
in the EU in the energy sector has fallen (private and public added 
together) by 40% since 1990, much more than that in the US (-13%), while it 
has increased in Japan (+22%). At the same time, it should be pointed out 
that the fall has primarily been caused by a drastic reduction in research on 
nuclear power. Figure 5 presents the structure of R&D for energy by area 
according to a new JRC publication (Wiesenthal et al., 2009). Yet, what is 
really striking is that 80% of public and private expenditure is concentrated 
in only 4 countries (France, Germany, the UK and Denmark) and 98% in 8 
Role of the EU budget in energy 
•  The funding and interventions to develop the TEN-E should be 
increased considerably, focusing on crucial nodes for a single 
European energy market,  using HVDC technology where 
appropriate.  
•  The introduction of HVDC lines and smart grids should be fostered, 
especially in the new member states, whenever infrastructure is 
modernised. Where necessary, directives should be introduced to 
ensure smart grids are not hampered by inappropriate national 
regulations. 
•  Energy efficiency conditionalities should be integrated in all projects 
funded by the budget. EU public procurement rules should integrate 
them.  
•  The use of alternative funding instruments to reach EU energy 
efficiency and emission targets should be expanded. FOR A FUTURE SUSTAINABLE, COMPETITIVE AND GREENER EU BUDGET | 37 
 
of the 27 member states! Investment in energy research is practically 
inexistent in 19 of the EU member states.  
Figure 5. EU public R&D research in energy 
 
Source: IEA as reproduced in Wiesenthal et al. (2009), which formed part of the 
presentation by G. Evans to the Task Force on 3 April 2009. 
That the share of R&D in this sector is low in the EU does not signify 
that the EU budget should intervene. Even so, according to fiscal 
federalism theories, R&D and innovation are better handled at the EU level 
because of potential economies of scale. Nevertheless, the EU is not a 
federal state and the EU budget, even after considerably increasing its 
resources, is unlikely to be allocated a very substantial share of the 
aggregate public R&D spending across the EU.  38 | MAJOR CHALLENGES FOR THE EU AND THE ROLE OF THE EU BUDGET 
 
There are, however, important initiatives by the EU. One of them is 
the SET Plan,24 a development plan at the EU level seeking to coordinate 
EU research and to channel the results towards commercial viability in the 
area of low carbon technologies. To a certain extent, the SET Plan is a 
response to the identified need to foster the necessary innovations to make 
medium and long-term EU objectives in energy a reality. The SET Plan is 
based on different technology platforms and initiatives concentrating on 
future technologies that should, in principle, be too risky for the private 
sector to invest in alone owing to the long-term, high investment 
requirements with uncertain success. It also finances joint public and 
private initiatives (collaborative business and research initiatives) in which 
the private sector would not invest given their transparent nature and 
partial loss of benefit from the open source aspects of the work. The 
platforms and initiatives bring together the European Commission, 
research institutes and corporate players in the field, to design a 
coordinated pan-European approach to the technological challenges ahead. 
The SET Plan is divided into three periods or technology waves. The 
first (until 2020) focuses on technologies that should be deployable soon, 
while the second (until 2050) seeks to develop more complex, long-term 
solutions (Table 1). The third wave (after 2050) presently just entails the 
deployment of fusion energy if the ITER25 and its successor demonstration 
plants succeed. 
One of the stumbling blocks in the SET Plan is the lack of funding to 
support the agreed strategies decided by the groups forming the platforms 
and initiatives. Another problem is the selective nature of the platforms, 
which to a certain extent, pre-defines where the EU is going to invest. A 
regular review of the direction of the SET Plan to ensure it stays on the 
leading edge of developments in energy is necessary. 
 
                                                      
24 See European Commission (2006a) and (2006b). 
25 The ITER refers to the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor being 
constructed in the south of France, financed by an international consortium 
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Table 1. First two technology waves of the SET Plan 
2010 2050 
•  Second-generation biofuels 
•  Commercialisation of CCS 
•  Larger wind turbines 
•  Large-scale PV and concentrating 
solar power systems 
•  Enable a single, smart grid 
•  Market energy-efficiency devices 
•  Long-term waste management 
•  Next generation of renewables 
•  Breakthroughs in energy storage 
•  Hydrogen fuel cell vehicles 
•  Gen-IV (nuclear) 
•  Complete ITER (fusion 
demonstration) 
•  Alternative vision TEN-E and 
other systems 
•  Breakthroughs in materials, 
nano-science, ICT, bio-science, 
etc. 
Source: Presented by G. Evans to the Task Force on 3 April 2009. 
 
Still, one has to tread carefully in the field of public R&D. The success 
of public funding of R&D in developing commercially viable products has 
been questioned by the OECD (2003), which saw a strong correlation 
between industrial R&D and growth, yet no clear relation for public R&D. 
This may be because public R&D tends to be directed towards basic 
research with longer maturity, but may also reflect some other 
‘performance and selection’ problems. The EU should be careful how R&D 
support is administered. Public R&D in the EU as a share of GDP is not low 
compared with the US and Japan (Núñez Ferrer, 2008), but private R&D is. 
A detailed EIB study published by CEPS (Uppenberg, 2009), finds that, 
with the exception of a few sectors, EU private companies are weaker in 
R&D than their American or Japanese counterparts are in some important 
areas. The JRC publishes yearly surveys on R&D in the EU and has recently 
published the results for 2008 (JRC, 2009). This survey does not compare 
results with non-EU countries, except for expected growth rates in R&D 
expenditure. But it depicts the relative importance of several factors 
affecting decisions to engage in R&D in the EU and it should be taken into 
consideration, as governments should aim at introducing positive 
incentives to foster private R&D. Unfortunately, the information is offered 
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as an aggregate of the EU and not by member state. This has important 
implications given that the tax regime is placed at the top of decision-
making by R&D-intensive industries26 and taxes vary considerably across 
member states.  
As low levels of private R&D across the EU seem systemic and 
largely owing to market and policy failures, member states should carefully 
review the causes at the national level. In addition, public authorities 
should be vigilant not only to avoid substituting private R&D funding with 
public funds, but also to avoid national public funding being replaced by 
EU financing. The principle of EU additionality should not be violated. The 
risk of public funding replacing private funding is a real one, as it is 
completely rational for private enterprises to seek to their R&D costs 
through public money. The collaboration between the public and private 
institutions through the SET Plan is very positive, but maximising the 
potential of the collaboration requires a distinct separation of roles between 
the public and the private sectors and most likely some improvements in 
the regulatory framework in a number of member states.  
There is also a need in all member states for the public sector to be 
more involved in R&D processes. This means the public administration 
taking an active part with respect to the area of research, with officials 
having an open dialogue with the public and private research sectors. 
While the systemic aspects need to be addressed, there are areas 
where the EU budget can play an influential role: 
a)  supporting the SET Plan by financing research in institutes across the 
EU, allowing for a coordinated effort and economies of scale. Efforts 
need to be directed at facilitating the collaboration between academic 
institutes and private companies in the framework programmes; 
b)  supporting the dissemination of results of the research undertaken, 
along with their demonstrating and commercialisation; and 
c)  financing the large-scale demonstration of technologies and their 
rollout, such as CCS, innovative electricity-grid technologies or other 
new energy systems. 
                                                      
26 R&D-intensive industries are biotechnology, health-care equipment & services, 
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A financial strategy for the SET Plan has been presented by the 
European Commission in a recent Communication (European Commission, 
2009e). This document outlines the road ahead and the resources needed 
according to the European Commission study in the accompanying impact 
assessment.27 The document estimates that for the SET group of 
technologies, the present investment in R&D (public and private) is €3 
billion annually. In 2007, €366 million came from the FP7 and Euratom FP7 
research programmes. The Communication calls for an increase in the 
combined resources to €8 billion a year or €50 billion over the next 10 years. 
For non-nuclear energy research, 30% of the funding is from public 
sources and a fifth of the public funds originate from the Community. To 
bring total funding for R&D on energy to €8 billion, public funding has to 
increase. The document provides a number of policy options to reinforce 
research in this area without specifying what level of funding from the EU 
budget would be necessary. What is clear is that in general, EU funding 
needs considerable reinforcement to participate in a leverage exercise of 
this magnitude. Of course, the funds raised from the ETS will also have to 
play a significant role in financing R&D. 
When considering how to approach R&D, it is important to take into 
account that there are compelling industrial and commercial reasons to 
promote R&D in the EU. If the EU manages to keep a lead in 
environmental technologies, it may also lead and capture the markets for 
environmental technologies in the future. It is now apparent that the US 
will become an important participant in global efforts and that China 
wishes to create its own green technologies. If the EU does not show a very 
strong commitment to green technologies backed by more than just words, 
it will miss the opportunity to lead the technological field and this global 
market. Despite the economic woes facing public resources, there is a good 
argument to shift EU and other public funding to this priority. Losing a 
leading position in the energy technologies of the future because of 
underinvestment will have a considerable impact in the competitiveness 
and growth of the EU economy. 
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4.3  Rethinking the role of the common agricultural policy 
Agriculture is a sector that will be highly exposed to climate change 
impacts, both negatively and positively. The negative impacts will exceed 
the positive ones, however. Studies show that some limited positive 
impacts are to be expected in northern Europe, but significant negative 
impacts will hit the sector in the south. The limited positive impacts in the 
north stem from the expected rise in precipitation and reduction in 
sunshine accompanying the milder winters and hotter summers. 
Meanwhile, the south (Mediterranean and south-eastern Europe) is 
expected to face recurring droughts. Adaptation to climate change is thus a 
central concern for the sector. 
Important impacts are already starting to be felt and the years 2020–
30 are forecasted to bring considerable stresses to the agricultural regions, 
not only in the form of water scarcity in the south, but also from a 
recrudescence of extreme weather events.  
The direct changes and extreme weather events are not the only 
threats, as they may be accompanied by further indirect damage. Higher 
temperatures and the northern increase in humidity will facilitate the 
spread of diseases and change pest patterns. Soil conditions will also be 
affected, with higher erosion risks in many areas and soil quality often 
EU budget in climate-related R&D 
•  Member states should tackle the foundations of low EU private 
investment in R&D. 
•  The SET Plan objectives should be regularly reviewed. 
•  Funding for the SET Plan should be reinforced to allow it to reach its 
objectives and facilitate the collaboration between research institutes 
and the private sector. 
•  The additionality of public and EU funding should be ensured. Any 
substitution of private funding for R&D by public funding or national 
public funding with EU funding must be avoided. 
•  Support should be given for disseminating the results of the research 
undertaken, along their demonstration and commercialisation. 
•  The large-scale demonstration of technologies and their rollout 
should be financed, such as CCS, innovative electricity-grid 
technologies or other new energy systems. FOR A FUTURE SUSTAINABLE, COMPETITIVE AND GREENER EU BUDGET | 43 
 
affected negatively, especially in drought regions. The extension of risk 
management systems, such as private insurance schemes to cover 
variability with public backing for extreme events, should be explored. 
Higher crop yields, volatility and risks of crop failures will require 
innovative forms of intervention, such as wider use of insurance schemes. 
Not only crops, but also livestock management will be affected. These 
changes may need support from the public sector, and the role of the EU 
budget in the agricultural sector will need to be reassessed. The European 
Commission’s White Paper (2009b) on adaptation and the sectoral working 
paper for agriculture list the difficulties ahead (European Commission, 
2009h). 
On mitigation, agriculture has a part to play, as it is an important 
contributor to emissions – presently 9% of the total. Notably, since 1990 
agriculture has already cut its emissions by 20%, owing to a decline in 
livestock, more sustainable farm practices and restructuring in the new 
member states. Further reductions are possible, but limited. An important 
area to investigate is changes in land use practices and carbon 
sequestration, as well as the sector’s participation in energy generation 
from energy crops or from farm by-products. 
The EU has a common policy for agriculture, which means that 
mitigation and adaptation policies are going to be mainly decided at the EU 
level. The EU also has a full subsidy mechanism in place for agriculture; the 
challenge is to implement the necessary measures, in a well-targeted and 
cost effective manner. The last 20 years of successive CAP reforms clearly 
demonstrate that fundamental changes to the policy are a complex issue. 
The report on the value added of agricultural policy in the EU written by 
CEPS for the European Parliament (Núñéz Ferrer and Kaditi, 2007) 
presents the weaknesses of the present policy. Subsidies are badly targeted 
and highly inefficient, and are based on parameters that are not related to 
actual problems or their costs. A review of studies by Boulanger and 
Messerlin (2009) on the CAP today highlights the serious dissociation 
between the CAP’s objectives, the modern needs of the sector and the 
structure of the policy. 
The CAP additionally has an indirect influence over the potential of 
the EU budget to address any new concerns. The EU budget is small and 
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budget are to be avoided. Tying up 40% of funds in the CAP restricts the 
freedom of manoeuvre of the budget,28 not only for other objectives in the 
budget, but also for the agricultural policy itself, which is under pressure to 
reduce its size. The co-financing of direct support has often been called for. 
This could reduce the size of the agricultural budget substantially, giving 
the EU budget more flexibility in the future. Co-financing could be done in 
a number of ways, based on differential obligations in keeping with the 
solidarity principle of the EU budget. Some are discussed in Núñez Ferrer 
(2008). 
The investments in the second pillar of the CAP, i.e. rural 
development, need to be in line with climate objectives. All measures need 
to integrate climate concerns, ensuring that investments in farms and the 
food industry follow best practices. Higher priority should be given to 
investments that reduce emissions. 
Land use, for instance, will be a key element for mitigation and 
adaptation. Reforestation and improving farm practices will be crucial for 
reducing emissions, but also for adapting to changes caused by climate 
change. Farming in some areas is expected to be hit severely by climate 
change and there is a strong argument to allocate support to the hardest hit 
areas to adapt or even phase out production. For the increase in extreme 
climatic events, the EU will need to explore insurance schemes with a 
public–private partnership to ensure that the private sector covers an 
important palette of risks, with the public sector intervening in the worst 
cases. The role of the EU in this regard is still to be defined and it could 
well be that this issue is largely a national one. 
From the standpoint of mitigation, new technologies could have the 
potential to reduce or sequestrate emissions. Changes in land use that 
prevent tile farming or foster increased carbon sequestration should be 
researched with support through the R&D budget and encouraged through 
incentives.  
One example that is gaining interest is a process of smouldering 
organic matter in a low-oxygen environment. The result is called ‘biochar’ 
                                                      
28 An argument often presented by defenders of the CAP is that reducing the 
expenditure will not mean that other headings will increase. Yet this is not a valid 
argument for maintaining inefficient expenditures and keeping a large share of the 
budget ‘occupied’. FOR A FUTURE SUSTAINABLE, COMPETITIVE AND GREENER EU BUDGET | 45 
 
by its promoters, a substance that (due to the process of production) serves 
to capture carbon in the soil and results in a fertiliser. The attractiveness of 
biochar is that it enables capturing more emissions than those generated 
from farming. The application of this technology in some farming areas 
could potentially reduce national emissions through offsetting. Introducing 
the practice into the ETS market could induce farmers to participate, as it 
could make the practice profitable. Of course, this could be combined with 
other possibilities, such as the generation of biofuels, and care has to be 
taken that this is not excessively used by emitters to avoid reducing 
emissions (by making agreements with farmers to offset their emissions). 
Another drawback is the impact on competing uses of farm by-products, 
from animal feed to inputs for the second generation of biofuels. 
 
 
4.4  Reducing emissions from transport 
Air and road transport produce a large share of anthropogenic emissions. 
Energy efficiency and alternative power systems need to be researched and 
the EU could support the development of the required infrastructure. In 
particular, the completion of the rail and waterways of the trans-European 
networks for transport (TEN-T) has the potential to reduce CO2 emissions.  
One promising aspect for cutting emissions concerns rail links among 
all major European centres and especially complete cargo links by rail and 
Facing the agricultural challenge 
•  The CAP will need to be further reformed, but its size in the budget 
should also be reduced. No policy should be fully funded by the EU 
budget, thus co-financing should be introduced. 
•  The spread of private insurance schemes in the agricultural sector 
should be explored and promoted to cater for increased variability, 
with public funds operating as guarantors in cases of extreme events. 
•  The rural development policy should integrate climate 
conditionalities in its interventions and prioritise investments in 
actions to reduce emissions. 
•  Land use practices that reduce emissions or allow carbon 
sequestration in production should be researched and encouraged 
through incentives. 
•  Climate resilience should be integrated into policy actions. 46 | MAJOR CHALLENGES FOR THE EU AND THE ROLE OF THE EU BUDGET 
 
waterways. Fast rail links between major cities have been shown to reduce 
the use of air and road travel. The carbon footprint of each mode of 
transport for both freight and passengers (infrastructure costs, energy 
efficiency and especially GHG emissions) must be taken into account to 
arbitrate investment choice in one mode of transport or the other. As 
regards rail, the French rail company SNCF has completed a study on the 
carbon footprint of one of its fast-speed rail links; in this case, the link was 
expected to become carbon-positive after 12 years of operation.29  
The highest potential reductions may probably lie more in shifting 
cargo off the roads30 into rail and further promoting multimodal transport. 
It is interesting to note that according to a study for the US,31 fuel efficiency 
since 1969 has doubled in cars, while fuel efficiency for trucks has remained 
stagnant. Therefore, cargo rail links across Europe should be considered 
very seriously, as the reductions in emissions, improved road safety and 
reductions in road congestion could be substantial.  
The financial effort is very large indeed, estimated at €900 billion for 
the total TEN-T, of which €271 billion is for projects deemed a priority over 
the period 2007–20 (European Commission, 2008a). It is notable that 
member state (EU-15) spending in transport as percentage of GDP has 
fallen since 1980 from 1.5% of GDP to less than 1% today (ibid.). New 
member states spend 1.5% of their GDP on transport infrastructure, but 
these countries also obtain support from the EU budget, and even for this 
level of expenditure, there have been issues related to the absorption 
capacity of the funds. The European Commission’s proposed level of EU 
funding for the 2007–13 budget for the TEN-T network was not approved 
and indeed was substantially reduced for that period. Hence, alternative 
solutions must be found for the challenges ahead.  
                                                      
29 See SNCF, “1er Bilan Carbone ferroviaire global – La Ligne à Grand Vitesse 
Rhine-Rhône au service d’une Europe durable”, SNCF, Paris, 2009. 
30 It is interesting to note that cargo transport on roads has increased substantially, 
while the energy efficiency of trucks has remained stable for 30 years, not showing 
the improvements seen in the passenger cars. 
31 See P. McKenna, “Kings of the Road”, New Scientist, No. 2721, 17 August 
(retrieved from http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg20327211.100-future-
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EU grant funding has its limitations. While in poorer regions of the 
EU the costs can be covered by as much as 85% through the cohesion funds, 
in other areas the only funds available are those dedicated to TEN-T, which 
finance 50% of the studies and 10% of the costs of priority projects, 30% of 
those with cross-border aspects and 10% of non-priority projects.  
As mentioned earlier in the case of energy grids, TEN-T links have 
also suffered from sluggish responses by member states, particularly in the 
case of rail. The EU has responded in turn by introducing a clause stating 
that unreasonable delays will cause priority projects to lose the support of 
the EU’s budget, thereby increasing the pressure on member states to 
complete the projects. 
Given the limited funds available, in this domain the EU has started 
to expand the use of financial tools in a serious way and foster public–
private partnerships. Here, the EU’s budget now also provides for the EIB 
loan guarantees – the LGTT (loan guarantee instrument for TEN-T 
projects). This instrument has been developed jointly by the European 
Commission and the EIB (through the latter’s European Investment Fund). 
Each year, the EU budget provides a given sum to the EIB as a loan 
guarantee. This is then used to cover part of the risks of projects and so 
improve their viability and attractiveness to private investors. LGTT is 
financed with a capital contribution of €1 billion (€500 million each from 
the Commission under the TEN-T budget and the EIB), which is intended 
to support up to €20 billion of senior loans. The amount of guarantee never 
exceeds more than €200 million, while the EIB is expected to offer loans for 
€50 billion over the next decade (EIB, 2006 and 2008). 
The EIB separately offers loan guarantees through the European 
Investment Fund and it has created a new financial instrument, the 
Transport Investment Facility. This consists of loans with maturities of up 
to 35 years and covers up to 75% of costs. 
The TEN policy has supported the contribution of public–private 
partnerships to implementing transport systems. The approach has been 
successful in spreading and potentially reducing overall costs while 
increasing efficiency. Yet, the introduction of user fees to recover the 
investments has to date been limited and ultimately the main bulk of the 
risks and costs have fallen on national governments, eroding the benefits of 
public–private partnerships. The attempt by the European Commission to 
introduce road charges with a Eurovignette has not been adopted across 
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presses ahead in this direction. The mechanism is described in more detail 
in a document on innovative financing methods (European Commission, 
2003). Only some countries use this to cover road infrastructure costs. 
The Eurovignette has other beneficial effects, such as encouraging 
people and freight to move off the road into (hopefully) rail and waterways 
(for cargo). Moreover, the revenues of the scheme can be reinvested in 
greener forms of transport. 
 
 
4.5  Improving environmental sustainability and ecosystem 
management 
Ecosystem management is increasingly recognised as an important aspect 
in nature conservation. In all areas of environmental management, it is 
becoming clear that programmes focusing on protecting specific species 
from manmade threats or from climatic events often fail because the 
functioning of their ecosystem is not understood or taken into account.  
In many areas, ecosystem management is progressively seen as the 
only way to preserve nature successfully and its all-important function of 
regulating the planet’s climate and habitability. Ecosystem management 
remains, however, a poorly recognised and funded endeavour. It is crucial 
that environmental protection is brought to the forefront of EU policy in a 
holistic fashion and that funding is reinforced. To a limited extent, Natura 
2000 and some no-fish areas do integrate the idea of ecosystems, but there 
is a need to go further. The same applies to areas of external action for 
climate change, where the protection of rainforest ecosystems, for example, 
is essential. 
It is recommended that the environmental protection of ecosystems 
becomes a more substantial financial element of the budget. Without an 
Transport 
•  The support for completing the priority TEN-T projects in rail and 
waterways should be increased, particularly the cargo capacity. 
•  The possibilities of public–private partnerships should be further 
explored and expanded, fully using the EIB to complement EU 
budget support.  
•  A coordinated, motorway tax Eurovignette has failed to materialise. It 
is recommended that this is introduced, with the revenues used to 
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ecosystem approach, the money spent on Natura 2000 could be wasted, as 
the programme is still too limited and lacks focus. 
Generally, there is a need to concentrate on the sustainability of 
resources. Increasing resource efficiency globally is important. The EU 
should reinforce general obligations on resource efficiency and integrate 
them across all EU operations. Resource depletion and climate change are 
intrinsically linked, and should be a central focus of policy. An example in 
the right direction is the adoption of the Ecodesign Directive,32 setting 
standards for energy-using products. 
 
 
4.6  Special support for climate actions generating EU-wide 
benefits 
Described in chapter 3 as a natural role for the EU budget, funds from the 
EU level serve as a useful compensation mechanism to ensure that projects 
with EU-wide benefits are undertaken. Infrastructure in specific areas may 
generate notable benefits for other member states or regions, while the 
region in which it must be constructed may not benefit or may prefer a 
cheaper or more limited solution. This philosophy is the same as that 
underlying the TENs. 
                                                      
32 See Directive 2005/32/EC of 6 July 2005 establishing a framework for the setting 
of ecodesign requirements for energy-using products and amending Council 
Directive 92/42/EEC and Directives 96/57/EC and 2000/55/EC, OJ L 191/29, 
22.7.2005. 
Environment and ecosystem management 
•  Environmental protection should become a prominent heading in the 
budget and should include a clear and strong element for ecosystem 
management (not including agricultural areas). This element should 
feature in external action as well. 
•  EU environmental programmes such as Natura 2000 need to 
introduce ecosystem sustainability among their core objectives. 
•  The EU should develop a more robust policy approach to resource 
efficiency. All EU operations domestically or abroad should aim at 
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In instances of cross-border, positive externalities, there is a strong 
case for financial support from the EU budget. Neighbouring countries can 
of course engage in joint initiatives, but for those with multiple interested 
parties, EU funding can facilitate the task. One example where this may 
apply is infrastructure for river flood protection. Similarly, some 
investments with large EU benefits may be detrimental to certain regions; 
in such instances, the EU budget could intervene to develop measures to 
mitigate the negative externalities. 
Catastrophes caused by climate change are expected to become more 
frequent. Thus, there is a case for increasing the financial allocation for 
emergency support. A budget line for climate change adaptation – focusing 
on rapid reaction, emergency support and reconstruction – should be 
considered. This fund could be used as an insurance guarantee for extreme 
events and could cover rapid, EU-level action in the event of wildfires or 
flooding. Some EU forest-fire initiatives and programmes already exist, but 
are for the moment mainly academic background exercises (Farmer and 
Baquerizo, 2006). In emergencies, EU-level responses are still partially ad 
hoc and it is important to have more established mechanisms. 
 
 
4.7  Helping developing countries with mitigation and 
adaptation 
The EU’s external challenges are phenomenal – without taking into account 
climate change. The potential financial responsibility of the EU for assisting 
non-EU countries to reduce emissions and adapt to changes will add a 
hefty additional cost. Despite the importance of external action for the EU’s 
peace and prosperity, and increasingly for averting the global climate 
crises, the external budget of the EU remains unrealistically low. It is true 
that the EU’s external action consists of the sum of all national budgets plus 
the EU’s part, but it is uncoordinated. While the EU has a common strategy 
Special budget for climate change 
•  Specific funds should be available to fund projects related to climate 
change with clear EU-wide benefits. 
•  The EU should also have the financial capacity to maintain an 
emergency fund to render assistance in the event of catastrophic 
wildfires or flooding. The EU should be able to deploy rapid response 
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and often presents itself as a single entity in negotiations, the member 
states play the leading role in developing countries. The fragmented actions 
and budget give very confusing signals to non-EU countries. 
There are various concerns about the complications created by 
parallel, uncoordinated, member state actions for development abroad, 
although the European Commission does not have a good reputation from 
an efficiency point of view. Nevertheless, to a certain extent, the operational 
quality of the EU’s interventions is affected by the institutional restrictions 
imposed by the EU member states. The EU is currently burdened by an 
excessive level of bureaucracy, controls and restrictions in its operations, 
which are often absent in similar operations by member states. There is 
thus a need to review fully the operations of the EU and the coordination, 
collaboration and reporting structures involved in the totality of the EU’s 
external aid. 
The small external budget is a serious handicap in view of the 
obligations the EU is likely to face in financing climate-related expenditures 
in developing countries. Transfers from developed to developing countries 
to finance mitigation and adaptation to climate change are expected to be 
vast.  
I n  a d d i t i o n  t o  e f f o r t s  b y  O E C D  countries, developing countries 
themselves – and especially emerging economies – need to address the 
challenge of climate change in the medium term. According to the reference 
scenario of the IEA (2009), global energy-related CO2 emissions may 
increase by about 40% between 2007 and 2030, thus putting additional 
pressure on the climate. The vast share of this increase comes from non-
OECD countries, above all from China. Limiting global warming to 2ºC 
above pre-industrial levels – a level below which EU policy-makers believe 
that irreversible ecological damages may still be avoided – will require cuts 
in global emissions of at least 50% by 2050 relative to 1990 levels. This 
would translate into reductions for industrialised countries in the 
magnitude of at least 80% by the same year (European Commission, 2009a).  
The EU and other industrialised countries should take the lead, given 
their historic responsibility for having emitted most of the current GHG 
stock in the atmosphere, which is responsible for climate change. The EU 
has started to address climate change with the adoption of its energy and 
climate change package in April 2009, entailing member state targets of 
decreasing GHG emissions by 20% below 1990 levels by 2020 (and up to 
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Still, bearing in mind that the EU was only responsible for roughly 14% of 
global, energy-related CO2 emissions in 2007 (IEA, 2009), and that in the 
reference scenario this share would decrease to around 9% by 2030 (ibid.), 
the EU’s ability to have a direct effect on global GHG emissions is limited. 
It will thus require a global alliance to avoid dangerous climate change. The 
need for fast-growing developing countries to start reducing their 
emissions rapidly is well illustrated by the projection that, even if all OECD 
countries were to reduce their GHG emissions to zero by 2030 (which is 
highly unrealistic), non-OCED countries alone would exceed global 
emission levels in line with the 2ºC threshold (IEA, 2009). 
A large and coordinated effort to face the costs of assisting 
developing countries in their actions to reduce emissions and adapt to 
change is crucial. Solid concerted action in the EU will thus be necessary, 
including clear signals for other countries to follow suit.  
The European Commission provided a blueprint on climate finance 
that seeks to support an ambitious, global agreement on climate change to 
be sealed in Copenhagen and to unblock the deadlock in international 
negotiations. It estimates that the finance requirements for adaptation and 
mitigation actions in developing countries will reach some €100 billion per 
year by 2020 (European Commission 2009c and 2009d). International public 
finance would have to contribute between €22-50 billion per year, while the 
bulk should come from two other sources: domestic public and private 
finance (20-40%) and flows leveraged by the international carbon market 
(up to 40%) (European Commission 2009d). The contribution of the carbon 
market will be significant, especially if facilitated by a new sectoral 
crediting mechanism. As to the public burden, the suggestion is to share it 
between developed and advanced developing countries “on the basis of 
ability to pay and responsibility for emissions” (European Commission 
2009c, p. 3). Based on these principles, the EU contribution to international 
public finance is estimated at between 10-30% and some €2-15 billion 
annually.  
These figures put forward by the European Commission may be 
underestimated, however. Behrens (2009), for example, shows that 
governments of EU member states and the European Commission may 
realistically need to contribute between €1.6-16 billion annually for 
mitigation alone. Another €1-11 billion may be added to address adaptation 
in developing countries. The flow of such large amounts of money requires 
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Absorption capacity depends on the quality of controls, administrative 
capacity and procurement procedures.  
It seems very unlikely that developing countries will be able to cope 
with such significant investment flows (some €200 billion annually, see 
Behrens, 2009) unless they can establish an appropriate legal, 
organisational and human resources framework to provide for an effective 
execution of financial flows. The focus should thus be put on the qualitative 
nature of low carbon investments in development countries rather than 
purely on quantitative figures. 
In comparison with the figures presented above, the capacity of the 
current EU budget to participate in climate change activities in developing 
countries is low, given the meagre size of the external action budget. The 
latter is well below any level required for contributing to the EU’s 
obligations towards the developing countries. While this can be handled by 
national budgets, the economies of scale of a centralised policy would be 
lost. It is also necessary to review existing developing programmes to adapt 
them and integrate climate change into their actions. 
A substantial increase in the external budget before the next Financial 
Perspectives is not feasible, while support for developing countries may 
start to increase earlier. A separate budget for this purpose could be a 
possible solution.  
 
External action 
•  The EU needs a policy supported by a budget more in line with its 
obligations and large enough to show a real commitment in assisting 
developing countries to reduce emissions and adapt to climate 
change. Without the developing world on board, EU emission 
reduction efforts will be dwarfed. 
•  Member states should give the EU the capacity, through a common 
policy, to present a strong common face along with the supporting 
financial means to reach concrete results in the climate negotiations in 
Copenhagen and beyond. 
•  With increasing financial flows to developing countries, absorption 
capacity becomes more important. The EU should not only focus on 
quantitative figures, but also on the qualitative nature of low carbon 
investments in developing countries.  
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5.  ADAPTING POLICIES FOR COHESION 
TO CLIMATE OBJECTIVES 
he EU’s cohesion policy deserves particular attention, as it represents 
a substantial, transnational transfer system among member states 
aimed at fostering growth in lagging regions. Despite its limited size, 
the EU’s cohesion policy has had a significant impact on the development 
path of recipient regions. Its effects are most apparent in the new member 
states, where it assists in the development of major infrastructure and more 
importantly influences national development strategies, as well as such 
aspects as national public procurement rules. The ability of the cohesion 
policy to have a bearing on development choices in the beneficiary areas is 
central to fostering actions that reduce emissions, but will progressively be 
called upon to help with adaptation. Many regions that fall under the 
cohesion policy are highly vulnerable to the repercussions of climate 
change, especially in southern Europe. 
The Community Strategic Guidelines for the structural and cohesion 
funds33 do mention the need for member states to promote investments in 
sustainable energy, transport and investments to contribute to the EU’s 
Kyoto commitments.  
Nevertheless, the guidelines were published in 2005, when climate 
change was not at the centre of policy development. The guidelines 
therefore do not give these actions the level of urgency or any precise 
obligation, as is the case for the Lisbon strategy, which benefits from 
earmarking and the requirement to prove the compatibility of programmes 
with this strategy. Likewise, no mention is made of adaptation.  
                                                      
33 See European Commission (2005).  
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As far as actual regulations are concerned, the cohesion fund 
regulation34 allows the following investments under Art. 2, para. 1(b): 
“energy efficiency and renewable energy and, in the transport sector 
outside the Trans-European Networks, rail, river and sea transport, 
intermodal transport systems and their interoperability, management of 
road, sea and air traffic, clean urban transport and public transport”. 
In the regulations on structural funds,35 Arts. 3, 5 and 6 include the 
possibility of funding actions to mitigate climate change. Table 2 presents 
the sections of the different cohesion-oriented EU funds where actions for 
CO2 reductions are proposed.  
At the outset, the incentives to use EU funding appropriately in this 
field were too weak. This was reflected in the programming documents, 
which were mainly oriented towards growth and fund absorption. Road 
infrastructure is, for example, one of the fastest ways to use EU funding. It 
is also clearly a major priority for most convergence regions, particularly 
the new member states, which actually runs counter to the need to reduce 
emissions. Roads are quicker and cheaper to build than fast rail links and 
cargo rail. The TEN-T for rail tends to trail far behind its road counterparts; 
some links have never been started. Energy efficiency was not at the heart 
of the development strategy in the new member states, despite these 
countries being highly energy inefficient per unit of output.  
 
                                                      
34 More specifically, see Council Regulation (EC) No. 1084/2006 of 11 July 2006 
establishing a Cohesion Fund and repealing Regulation (EC) No. 1164/94, OJ L 
210/79, 31.7.2006. 
35 See Council Regulation (EC) No. 1083/2006 of 11 July 2006 laying down general 
provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social 
Fund and the Cohesion Fund and repealing Regulation (EC) No. 1260/1999, OJ L 
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Table 2. Funding options for CO2 reductions in the EU budget 
  Cost item   Funding options 
 
   ERDF 1)  ESF 2) Cohesion 
fund 
EAFRD 3) 
Administration costs (funding of 
regulatory authorities) 
– –  –  – 
Developing public procurement 
criteria for energy efficiency 
 –  (3.2b(i))    –   – 
Establishment of energy agencies   –  –   –   – 
Capacity building for public 
administrations 
 –  (3.2b(i)) 
(3.2b(ii))  
 –   – 
Capacity building for businesses  (4.1) (4.7) 
(6.2d) 
(3.2b(ii))    –   – 
Strengthening related regulatory 
authorities 
 –  (3.2b(i)) 
(3.2b(ii))  
 –   – 
Studies and plans  (4.3) (5.2b)   (3.2b(i))    –   – 
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Research  (4.1)    –   –   – 
Operation of participation systems 
(esp. for the resolution of conflicts) 
–   (3.2b(ii))   –  – 
Operation of awareness and 
information systems 
(4.2)   –  –  – 
Support to business for the uptake 
of energy-saving solutions 
(4.1) (4.3) 
(5.1a) (5.1b) 
(5.2b)  
 –  (2.3)   (28) 4)  
Support to households to adopt 
energy-saving solutions 
– –  –  – 
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Support for the development of 
relevant skills and techniques 
(4.1) (5.1a) 
(5.1b) 
(3.1a(i)    –  – 
Development of renewable energy 
sources 
(4.7) 
(5.2b) 
– (2.3)    – 
Development of co-production 
infrastructures 
(4.7) 
(5.2b) 
– (2.3)    – 
Improvement of networks  (4.7) 
(5.2b) 
– –  – 
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Refurbishment, improvement or 
establishment of district heating 
systems 
(4.7) 
(5.2b) 
– –  – 
1) European Regional Development Fund 
2) European Social Fund 
3) European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development 
4) While possible, no direct mention of energy efficiency is made, only the general modernisation 
of technology. 
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The planned distribution of funds over the period is presented in 
Figure 6. The share of investments in the environment or climate change-
oriented expenditure is difficult to subtract from the figures. Studies on the 
matter seem, in some cases, to contradict one another owing to the 
interpretation of what constitutes an investment in climate change 
protection. According to the figures presented by the European 
Commission (Berkowitz, 2009), the funds directly related to climate change 
(renewable energy, energy efficiency, mitigation and adaptation to climate 
change, air quality and risk prevention) represent 4.7% of the cohesion 
policy funding. A further 9.2% is indirectly related to climate change 
(railways, mobile rail assets, cycle tracks, intelligent transport systems and 
clean urban transport). Around 90% of the combined 13.9% is spent 
through the convergence funds. Table 3 presents the distribution of this 
13.9% of the funds by area of action. 
Figure 6. Breakdown of cohesion spending 2007–13 
 
Source: Presentation by P. Berkowitz (2009). 
Breakdown of cohesion spending 2007-2013 by category
(billion EUR)
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Table 3. Distribution of climate change-related funds by area 
Investment type  Area of action  €  % 
Direct   Air quality  1,020,376,565  2.1 
Direct   Climate change  304,727,396  0.6 
Direct   Energy efficiency  4,192,277,448  8.8 
Direct   Renewable energy  4,785,767,205  10.0 
Direct   Risk prevention  5,828,968,710  12.2 
Indirect   Cycle tracks  634,419,290  1.3 
Indirect   Intelligent systems and 
clean urban transport 
7,257,185,855  15.2 
Indirect   Rail  23,878,214,407  49.8 
Total   47,901,936,876  100.0 
Source: Presentation by P. Berkowitz (2009). 
Climate change and energy efficiency nevertheless began to take 
centre stage in EU policy shortly after the start of the programming period. 
The political importance of emission reductions, the EU target reductions of 
20-30% in 2020 and the introduction of the ETS are having an effect in 
changing the development objectives of countries, but these changes have 
to be patched into the existing structural fund strategies, which will likely 
result in more inefficient and less effective outcomes.  
The efforts are considered insufficient in a number of reports, 
particularly for energy efficiency and renewable energy. Concern has been 
raised by two studies36 that have analysed the level of allocated 
expenditures for the new member states for the programming period 2007–
13. But according to European Commission figures, their performance is 
not worse than that of many of the ‘old’ member states. Table 4 shows the 
shares of funds allocated to energy efficiency and renewables in the 
convergence regions37 of the EU.  
                                                      
36 See WWF and German Federal Ministry of Environment, Nature Conservation 
and Nuclear Safety (2007) and CEE Bankwatch Network and Friends of the Earth 
(2007). 
37 Convergence regions are those with a per-capita average GDP under 75% of the 
EU average, i.e. under Objective 1 of the structural funds. FOR A FUTURE SUSTAINABLE, COMPETITIVE AND GREENER EU BUDGET | 59 
 
Table 4. EU funds allocated to energy efficiency and renewables in convergence 
regions within the member states 
Member state  % share of funds  Member state  % share of funds 
Bulgaria 2.9  Lithuania  6 
Czech Republic  4.5  Malta  4 
Germany 1.5  Poland  1.8 
Spain 0.7  Portugal  1.1 
Estonia 2.1  Romania  2.3 
Greece   1.8  Slovak Republic  1.5 
Hungary 1.5  Slovenia  3.9 
Italy  6.6 UK  3.7 
Latvia 2.8  –  – 
Source: DG for Regional Policy. 
Looking at the EU budget interventions is a very biased way to 
observe the commitment of member states to climate change actions. EU 
interventions have not been designed primarily to target climate change, 
and national actions are more important i n  t h i s  f i e l d .  N a t i o n a l  s c h e m e s  
based on other forms of intervention, through subsidies, regulation or fiscal 
incentives, play the leading role. For instance, Germany is a leader in the 
renewable energy sector and cannot be accused of neglect, even if scarcely 
any EU funds are directed at this priority. Countries are also adapting their 
actions during the programming period, which means that over time there 
should be some movement in the line of shifting investments towards 
climate change compared with the original operational programmes. 
Indeed, there is an indication that state aid directed towards the 
environment and energy saving (energy efficiency and renewables) in 
many EU member states has increased considerably. This can be discerned 
by looking at the direction of state aid in the member states (public support 
excluding Community funds and instruments) using DG Competition’s 
state aid scoreboard.38 Figure 7 shows that the EU-2739 has strongly shifted 
                                                      
38 The European Commission’s DG Competition scoreboards exclude state aid to 
agriculture, fisheries and railways. 
39 The data exclude Bulgaria and Romania, which were not EU member states in 
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the emphasis of state aid from sectoral support to horizontal priorities and 
environmental issues, and energy saving in particular. This has been quite 
recent, with a remarkable shift from priorities visible in the periods 2003–04 
and 2005–07.  
Figure 7. Share of state aid for horizontal priorities in the environment and energy 
sectors (EU-27) 
Trend in share of primary objectives as % of total aid
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Source: The European Commission’s state aid scoreboard (retrieved from 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/state_aid/studies_reports/ 
stat_tables.html). 
 
Yet, this shift has not been equal in all EU countries: the same shift 
has not occurred in the new member states (Figure 8) or the remaining ‘old’ 
cohesion countries (Greece, Spain and Portugal). While a reduction in 
sectoral aid has generally occurred with a shift in the emphasis towards 
horizontal issues, environmental and energy-saving investments have not 
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Figure 8. Share of state aid for horizontal priorities in the environment and energy 
sectors, new member states (EU-12) 
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Source: The European Commission’s state aid scoreboard (retrieved from 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/state_aid/studies_reports/ 
stat_tables.html). 
Still, and to be fair, the non-cohesion countries (France, Italy and 
Ireland) do not seem to have increased the share of investment in the 
environment and energy either (as shown in this segment of Figure 9). It is 
interesting to note the large differences in the state aid structures, especially 
Portugal’s nearly exclusive sectoral support and Greece’s nearly exclusive 
regional support, underscoring the wide divergences among member state 
needs or policy priorities. 
Even taking into account that energy efficiency and a reduction of 
GHG emissions can be achieved through support in other aid categories 
(urban transport, regional aid, rail network expansion or communal 
heating-system improvements), climate concerns are not well integrated in 
national development plans. 
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Figure 9. State aid priorities in 2007 in France, Greece, Italy, Ireland, Spain and 
Portugal, compared with the EU average 
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Source: The European Commission’s state aid scoreboard (retrieved from 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/state_aid/studies_reports/ 
stat_tables.html). 
Another strong criticism by EU budget studies is that large 
investments are for activities that will foster CO2 emissions, well over any 
reductions likely to be achieved. Transport absorbs the highest share of the 
EU funds in the new member states, at between 20 and 30% of the funds. 
Of those funds, 53% is allocated to road transport. The planning for public 
transport is still deficient in the structural fund strategies of most new 
member states and climate concerns are not central to the planning process. 
There is also a serious worry that EU funding in the past has encouraged a 
significant increase in emissions (Figure 10), most notably in the road 
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1990 and 2005, compared with a total reduction of emissions by the EU-15 
as a whole of 1.5%. The priorities of new member states for the EU funds 
are similar to those of the EU-15 cohesion countries in past programming 
periods. Of course, these increases start from a low base, but demonstrate 
the speed of the change and how quickly emission allowances in the new 
member states can be eroded. 
Figure 10. Change in GHG emissions in the cohesion countries, 
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Sources: Eurostat database, published in Egenhofer et al. (2008). 
Transport is one of the most sensitive areas in relation to climate 
actions. The largest investments of the cohesion policy are in transport and 
road transport is the easiest to implement. Investments in green transport 
have nonetheless become prominent in the programmes, and according to 
the planned programmes of member states, 36% will be dedicated to green 
transport.40 The increasing prioritisation of rail is clear, with nearly 30% of 
                                                      
40 Green transport here includes cycle tracks, intelligent transport systems, 
railways, mobile rail assets, clean urban transport and the ‘blue’ transport: 
waterways, multimodal transport and ports (8.7% of funds). 64 | ADAPTING POLICIES FOR COHESION TO CLIMATE OBJECTIVES 
 
the funds pre-allocated to rail; whether these rail projects are realised, 
however, remains to be seen.  
For the new member states, the share of EU funds allocated to climate 
issues is particularly important, owing to the limited capacity of national 
budgets and the extensive need to improve energy efficiency.  
Another new and interesting measure of the structural funds is the 
possibility to use EU funds for housing in the new member states.41 This 
would allow funding for energy efficiency in housing and promote use of 
renewable energy sources. Yet, the measure does not spell this out 
specifically, and hence represents a missed opportunity given that 40% of 
all CO2 emissions in the EU originate from the building sector,42 of which 
77% stem from the residential side.43 That notwithstanding, in March 2009, 
the European Parliament voted to expand the scope of investments in the 
housing sector by explicitly including a measure for energy efficiency in 
housing in the structural funds for all member states. The EU will support 
investments in energy efficiency, including retrofitting existing housing.  
Despite the somewhat increased presence of positive news on the 
priorities of the cohesion funds, the 2007–13 programming period still 
treats climate change as a fringe issue, as it was not at the centre of 
programme development. It is possible that the new member states were 
too complacent in the programmes and in other national plans. They all 
had a significant level of ‘slack’ in their Kyoto commitments. The EU also 
absorbed their slack and allowed the new member states an increase of 20% 
in GHG emissions. This slack is being absorbed very rapidly and the 
performance of the old cohesion countries as presented above shows that a  
 
                                                      
41 “Within the framework of an integrated urban development operation, it is 
considered necessary to support limited actions to renovate housing in areas 
experiencing or threatened by physical deterioration and social exclusion in the 
Member States that acceded to the European Union on or after 1 May 2004” (p. 1, 
para. (5) of Regulation (EC) No. 1080/2006 of 5 July 2006 on the European Regional 
Development Fund and repealing Regulation (EC) No. 1783/1999, OJ L 210/12, 
31.7.2006). 
42 This figure is derived from Directive 2002/91/EC of 16 December 2002 on the 
energy performance of buildings, OJ L 1/65, 4.1.2003, pp. 65–71. 
43 This figure, by CECODHAS (European Liaison Committee for Social Housing), 
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20% increase in emissions can be reached quickly. As of 2012, new and old 
member states alike will face the challenge of transforming into a low 
carbon economy. 
Another area where the EU funds should focus resources is the 
reduction of methane emissions through appropriate waste management 
and by tackling urban sources that even create ozone in certain areas. Here 
action can be swift with current knowledge and have an impact on 
reducing the GHG accumulation in the atmosphere. 
5.1  Strategy 
A lack of concern over emissions is not the only reason for the absence of 
real commitment in the programmes. A serious problem has been the 
capability of the administrations to integrate a national strategy efficiently. 
The quality and implementation of the strategy is crucial to the 
performance of the funds (see Leonardi, 1995 and Núñez Ferrer, 2007a and 
2007b). 
The development of a coherent national strategy is complex and 
requires highly skilled specialists and strong political backing. Many EU 
countries continue to lack the capacity to develop good strategies and 
implement them. There is a need to use all available avenues, such as 
twinning projects to transfer the necessary knowledge in these fields. This 
has been recognised and the European Commission is reinforcing 
mechanisms to transfer best practice. In addition, there is a need to extend 
the awareness of the options for integrating climate change concerns 
horizontally in structural actions. Also, to date there is no clear, consistent 
methodology for estimating the impact of the GHGs of EU programmes. 
This needs to be developed to make meaningful programmes with 
quantifiable results to mitigate their emissions.   
What can be inferred from the different reports on the issue is that 
there is still, for the cohesion policy, a lack of coherence in the approach to 
climate change. For energy, for example, the CEETA (2005) analysis 
detected that in a number of actions on renewable energy, there was a lack 
of connection with energy efficiency, i.e. new, renewable energy systems 
may supply energy-inefficient houses or industries. This finding is 
important for cohesion policy: if projects are not energy efficient, the 
benefits of increasing renewable energy will be partly eroded. 
Generally, the problem of the cohesion policy, as in general for other 
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horizontal problem. Reducing emissions and adapting to climate change 
are not tackled by adding a measure or two into the areas of intervention; 
they require a systemic change and integration across all areas. To achieve 
this, it is necessary that the linkages among different actions are 
understood and form part of coherent local and national strategies. The 
deployment of renewable energy systems and energy efficient systems 
requires the introduction of better-integrated grids. The want of a coherent, 
horizontal climate policy at multiple governance levels is particularly 
striking for cities.44 Although 74% of the EU population lives in urban 
areas, responsible for 75% of emissions,45 the consistent and strategic 
integration of cities into the climate debate remains absent and city 
authorities often lack the necessary empowerment to act. The urban aspects 
of climate change should have a much clearer presence in the cohesion 
policy and all urban initiatives in the EU budget. The population density of 
cities allows for projects with substantial economies of scale and quick 
efficiency gains. 
5.2  Opportunities in new member states 
New member states that have an ageing energy infrastructure offer a 
perfect opportunity for the introduction of smart grids, where renewable 
energies and private consumer–suppliers play an increasing role 
(consumers with their own energy sources such as solar panels, who can 
sell excess energy). But such an approach requires a clear national strategy. 
EU funds, national funds, private operators and legislators need to 
coordinate a multiyear, large-scale, solid strategy. Structural programmes 
remain an amalgamation of loose measures, with renewable energy or 
energy efficiency support offered as single independent measures 
unrelated to an overall, coherent energy infrastructure. Hence, support 
through the cohesion policy for the development of low carbon cities or 
entire regions should be encouraged. 
                                                      
44 The topic of cities and climate change is currently being examined by another 
CEPS Task Force, which is due to publish its results in late 2009 (see 
http://www.ceps.be/taskforce/eu-and-global-climate-change-policy-and-
increasing-role-cities). 
45 See the Eurostat Statistics in Focus article by B. Feldmann, “The Urban Audit — 
Measuring the quality of life in European cities”, Statistics in Focus, No. 82/2008. FOR A FUTURE SUSTAINABLE, COMPETITIVE AND GREENER EU BUDGET | 67 
 
One promising way ahead could be the running of large-scale pilot 
programmes for low carbon zones in cities and regions of the new member 
states. This would assist the modernisation of these regions and the 
creation of green jobs. Apart from infrastructure, support through the 
European Social Fund (ESF) for acquiring the necessary skills associated 
with a low carbon programme would lead to the development of more 
sustainable regions and indeed a knowledge economy – in line with the 
growth and jobs objectives of the EU. 
It is therefore recommended that the cohesion policy integrate a 
significant energy production and efficiency component, with a link to 
concrete national actions. Such move should also tie in with the EU’s 
objectives for a single market in energy, and thus include a strong cross-
border energy component.  
 
 
Cohesion policy 
•  Energy and energy efficiency need to be incorporated throughout 
regional and national strategies for intervention. 
•  The polluter pays principle should be fully integrated. 
•  The strategic component of the programmes should be strengthened, 
particularly with the aim of contributing to a better-integrated energy 
system. New member states offer an opportunity for substituting 
ageing infrastructure with new, smart grid technologies, which can 
only be implemented under a coherent national strategy. 
•  Offers to reinforce assistance for strategic development should be 
made and the transfer of best practices expanded. 
•  There is a need for a clear methodology for accounting for the GHG 
impacts of EU programmes. 
•  The role of urban areas in mitigation and adaptation should be 
enhanced, ensuring consistency with national actions. 
•  The creation of low carbon zones through cohesion policy assistance 
should be considered.  
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6.  RECOVERY PLANS, THEIR FOLLOW-UP 
AND OTHER FINANCIAL MECHANISMS 
he economic recovery plans, and in particular the EU’s recovery 
plan, is a matter of substantive dispute with respect to climate 
change. Many countries around the world have released historically 
unheard-of levels of public funds into the economy to save the banking 
sector from total collapse and to cushion the global economic slowdown. 
These recovery plans try to ensure that loan mechanisms to the private 
sector continue to prevent a significant contraction of the private sector and 
therefore a contraction of demand.  
At the same time, such stimulus packages can also be devised to 
redirect economic activities, and this idea has been somewhat successfully 
sold to policy-makers by many non-governmental organisations, which 
saw a unique opportunity to direct funding away from environmentally 
unfriendly activities towards the development of low carbon economies. 
Failure in redirecting the funding also constitutes a very clear danger for 
the development of a low carbon economy. Fuel prices have fallen with 
demand, making renewables less attractive again, while the downturn has 
initially reduced the growth of renewables and clean technologies by 90%. 
To avoid a lock-in of the green sectors, these have to be given an advantage 
during this downturn, allowing them to take a leading place in the market 
in a future upturn. Furthermore, once the recovery plans subside, there is a 
need to ensure that the stimulus created does not flatten out. In this respect, 
follow-up is important. 
The aim of directing recovery packages towards green technology 
development is to mobilise funding in such a way as to establish a large 
green energy base sufficient to start nothing other than an energy 
revolution. Unstable oil prices, increasing energy security concerns and the 
growing awareness that our energy consumption is going to affect our lives 
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in one generation and for millennia to come (in many cases negatively) is 
providing a window of opportunity for a wave of behavioural change 
through clear policy commitments. The WWF, EG3, the Institute for 
European Environmental Policy and the Green Alliance have led the work 
on the recovery packages.46  
6.1  International comparison of stimulus packages 
According to figures provided by Mabey (2009), the current global stimulus 
packages amount to roughly $1.8 trillion for the period 2008–10 (3.25% of 
GDP). Höhne et al. (2009) present a detailed scoreboard. Of this amount, a 
(generously) estimated 23% ($436 billion) is allocated to low carbon 
infrastructure and investments of which infrastructure is the bulk, with 
only 8% remaining in other investments ($140 billion), which is slightly 
over half the investments planned in road infrastructure. Given that a 
return oil prices of $140 per barrel would cost the US, the EU and Japan 
$800 billion a year, there is some rationale to focus more on low carbon 
investments. Interestingly, it is China that has the largest share of its 
stimulus package concentrated on low carbon development (Figure 11). 
Figure 11. International comparison of green stimulus packages 
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Source: HSBC estimates. 
                                                      
46 See Höhne et al. (2009), Mabey (2009), Withana and Baldock (2009) and Hewett 
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Despite the EU’s advanced thinking in the area of climate change and 
the environment, it shows little actual engagement in practice with the 
green stimulus packages. These have been considered rather incoherent 
and unfocused in the analysis performed by Withana and Baldock (2009). 
6.2  The EU’s stimulus package 
In 2008, the EU launched the European Economic Recovery Plan, setting 
out a package of measures to be implemented at the EU and national levels. 
The plan proposed an impulse of 1.5% of EU GDP (€200 billion), to be 
invested in specific smart activities, green technologies and climate change 
as part of the smart investments. Approximately €170 billion was to come 
from member states, accompanied by €30 billion from the EU, obtained by 
liberating unspent margins and rearranging priorities, including the wider 
use of pre-financing from the European social funds and the cohesion 
funds (de facto not new money) and the use of lending instruments. From 
the entire package, the shares for the environment are as follows: 
•  The EIB has increased its lending by €6 billion for 2009 and a similar 
figure for 2010 for climate, energy and green infrastructure 
investments. 
•  The EBRD is to contribute €0.5 billion to new member states, partially 
for energy efficiency. 
•  Three new, clean technology initiatives have been launched, entailing 
€5 billion for green cars, €1 billion for energy-efficient buildings and 
€1.2 billion for greener industries (the “Factories of the Future” 
initiative). 
•  The Commission put forward a €5 billion set of measures, of which 
over €2 billion is for gas (€1.44 billion) and electricity interconnection 
(€910 million), €15 million is for small island projects, €565 million is 
for offshore wind projects and just over €1 billion is for CCS. 
This package has raised all manner of concerns and criticisms. Its 
legality has been questioned by member states and the Council. But some 
also criticise it for being too shortsighted.  
Compared with the size of national stimulus packages, the EU 
budget’s €5 billion (which is the ‘real additional’ money from the EU 
budget) looks feeble, but this is because of the lack of financial freedom in 
the EU budget. The amount is made up of unused money from budgetary 
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also provoked some very negative reactions. On a share basis, the 
Commission’s is the greener of all the stimulus packages (around 50% 
depending on the interpretation) with regard to low-carbon energy 
investments, but it is considered financially wasteful by some 
commentators, as it primarily benefits large energy providers that are 
highly profitable by factors far greater than the size of the package. The 
additionality created by the funds is therefore questionable.  
While this criticism is an issue of dispute, the EU budget should 
generally experiment more with non-grant forms of intervention and more 
specifically with loan guarantees for financial institutions such as the EIB. 
This is happening for the cohesion policy and the TENs, but only to a 
limited extent. One area where the recovery package could have had a 
strong impact is in the fostering of smart grids through urban initiatives. 
The challenges in this area are daunting and energy efficiency in urban 
areas is a key to driving down emissions speedily. 
In any case, the real problem of the recovery plans is that they are by 
nature short term. To maintain the momentum of the plans, the operations 
started with these funds must be solidly established, or some different 
public mechanisms should be put in place to see them carried out. Here the 
role of financial institutions such as the EIB may be crucial. Yet, the green 
aspect of any additional financial support for the economy should be 
geared better towards making the economy itself greener.  
6.3  The role of lending institutions 
When funds are limited, the use of EU budget resources as loan guarantees 
for the EIB in specific areas are deemed much more effective in mobilising 
investment. This is the case for TEN-T investments and the same reasoning 
could apply to the energy sector. The €5 billion recovery funding from the 
EU budget could likewise have been used as loan guarantees, mobilising 
loans to a level reaching up to 20 times the loan guarantee amount (with 
funds from the EIB offering another guarantee part). The quality of the 
projects is enhanced, as loans increase the responsibility of loan recipients 
to ensure that it can be repaid. This is also good and more sustainable way 
to stimulate the economy.  
To maintain the momentum of the recovery packages and to continue 
fostering a sustainable, low carbon economy, the EIB could augment its 
provision of loans to the energy sector and activities that create green jobs. 
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possibilities for increasing the loan guarantees of the EIB in the area of 
energy and target, for example, the development of low carbon cities.  
The EIB has been substantially increasing its interventions in the 
energy sector, reaching a planned €9.5 billion for this year. It has funds for 
clean transport and is planning the launch of another large new fund, the 
2020 European Fund for Energy, Climate Change and Infrastructure (the 
‘Marguerite fund’) to finance equity and quasi-equity projects in these 
areas and support the internal energy market, the integration of renewables 
and enhanced internal security of supply (EIB, 2009).  
Nevertheless, despite the important role the EIB could be playing, it 
is crucial to ensure the additionality of EIB actions. Funds should not be 
crowding out the private financial sector, but concentrate on interventions 
where the risks are too high or the maturity of projects too long to attract 
private funding.  
Another aspect for the EIB is to expand its loans to developing 
countries through instruments such as concessional loans. This effort 
should focus on development programmes that also integrate climate 
change actions either to reduce emissions or build resilience to climate 
change in the future.  
Finally, a very interesting and useful proposal with wide-ranging, 
positive implications is the creation of a bond scheme issued directly by the 
European Commission for capital investments, such as the large trans-
national projects of common EU interest, e.g. the Galileo programme. This 
has been proposed by a much-discussed CEPS publication by Iozzo et al. 
(2008). 
 
 
Recovery plans, their follow-up and other financial instruments 
•  The green aspects of stimulus packages need more focus and the 
continuation of the efforts begun should be ensured. 
•  The wider use of EIB instruments should be fostered. With an 
increase in the loan guarantees, the EIB could release much larger 
amounts of funds for projects across the EU and beyond. Loan 
performance and efficiency tends to be greater than is the case with 
grants. Yet care should be taken that loans do not crowd out private 
finance, but instead attract it. 
•  The introduction of EU bonds for large capital investments of EU-
wide interest should be considered.  
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7.  CONCLUSIONS 
his report establishes that the EU budget has a role to play in 
combating climate change, from reducing emissions to adapting to 
the impacts. With climate change a top priority among the concerns 
expressed in the public consultation by the European Commission in 
September 2007, there is a strong, legitimate reason to integrate it 
extensively across the EU’s operations.  
The budget is by nature very limited in size, but can play a vital role 
in cross-border infrastructure, solidarity among member states and EU-
level coordinated action, and act as an effective leverage tool for fostering 
attainment of the EU’s climate objectives. A positive aspect of focusing 
actions to create a low carbon economy is that it promotes the Lisbon 
objectives, by facilitating the creation of green jobs and boosting the rate of 
innovation. In so doing, it also develops further the knowledge economy 
and the EU’s competitiveness in key technologies of the future. 
The report highlights that to have a strong, renewable energy sector 
in the EU and increase energy efficiency, it is crucial to complete the single 
market in energy by linking the national grids to a single pan-European 
grid. It also shows that in the future, for increased use of renewable energy 
from different sources and for handling greater energy fluctuations, the EU 
will need to develop its HVDC connections. For this effort, the EU budget 
can provide substantial assistance through the TEN-E budget and the 
cohesion policy, ensuring the necessary interconnectivity. Support is very 
limited, however, and needs more resources. New financial instruments 
linked to the EIB and other financial institutions, or the creation of EU 
bonds for critical infrastructure in the EU should be investigated. 
The EU budget furthermore has an important role to play in R&D, in 
funding and coordinating research across the EU, ensuring economies of 
scale and promoting the spread and adoption of technologies. The EU’s 
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SET Plan is a useful structure for the future to streamline research and 
forge partnerships of industry and academia; however, it too requires a 
higher level of resources. In addition, the R&D budget should invest in 
longer-term untested technologies and help finance large-scale 
demonstrations, such as those for CCS. Allocations for the co-financing of 
demonstrations of innovative ‘smart grids’ should be considered. In this 
context, the EU cohesion policy could focus some of its resources on 
replacing obsolete grids in new member states with smart grids. The new 
member states could become showcases of these technologies, while 
achieving higher growth and increasing employment through such 
investment and modernisation.  
The report simultaneously warns that increasing public funds alone is 
not enough. The low levels of private R&D in the EU are caused primarily 
by systemic problems. Member states need to review the factors that affect 
private R&D in their countries and undertake any necessary reforms. 
The EU budget should continue to assist and increase its support for 
the TEN-T rail and waterway networks, particularly those for cargo 
transport. Member states should introduce the Eurovignette for their roads, 
to help fund the maintenance of the TENs and promote green transport. 
The Eurovignette would also encourage the use of alternative transport. 
It is recommended that the EU budget increases its support for large 
catastrophic events – flooding, droughts and forest fires have been growing 
in severity over the years and their frequency is expected to rise. A 
coordinated action mechanism and a special budget line could be created. 
This budget line could additionally cover large adaptation infrastructure, 
with benefits beyond the countries in which such infrastructure is located, 
for example, flood protection systems. 
The external action budget of the EU is very small, and does not have 
the capacity to contribute in any major way to obligations to non-EU 
countries in the area of climate change. Although it is possible for member 
states to run their own schemes, this approach may cause coordination and 
coherence problems. A coordinated effort by the EU would be appropriate, 
which could be financed from the EU budget or a separate and substantial 
budget. 
One of the main limitations of the budget is its size. It is too small to 
cover adequately all of the EU’s ambitious objectives. Furthermore, most of 
the budget is taken up by two policies, the CAP and the cohesion policy. 
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wide income disparities existing today, the EU budget share of the CAP is 
not. Even if the EU budget has a role to play in helping the agricultural 
sector to adapt to changes, this needs to be done by more efficient 
mechanisms than the present direct payments. The direct support system is 
inefficient, and it suffers from an accumulation of objectives. Targeting 
needs to be increased. The EU budget should not in any case be used to 
finance the entire cost of any policy. Unless the EU budget is increased 
substantially, it should limit itself to leveraging operations and co-financing 
policies. The CAP should thus be co-financed, with rates being based on the 
fiscal capacity of the member states for example, which would be in line 
with the solidarity principle of the budget.  
For the cohesion policy, it is recommended that climate objectives are 
fully integrated, not only having measures incorporate best practices for 
emission reductions, but also by taking the opportunity to experiment with 
low carbon zones. Some new member states have energy grids that need 
updating. This situation represents a unique opportunity to test new 
energy systems and smart grids on a large scale. The direct and indirect 
effects on the economic development of the regions affected would be 
substantial and fall in line with the need to create jobs, increase human 
capital and move towards a knowledge economy. This is an opportunity 
not to miss. It is also a good case for public–private partnerships, whereby 
the cohesion policy could be complemented by the interventions of the EIB 
and the private sector. 
Important for the cohesion policy operations is the quality of strategic 
planning, and the imperative of integrating it into the EU procurement 
rules and climate conditionalities. 
The large recovery plans and particularly those of the EU have 
directed some of their efforts towards green technologies, but the recovery 
plans are limited in time. For the EU, reinforcing the lending power of the 
EIB in this area can provide a useful follow-up. The EIB is very well placed 
to allocate lending for climate actions, with guarantees by member states. 
Alongside the EIB, the EU could offer bonds aimed at financing large 
infrastructure of EU-wide importance.  
Finally yet importantly for the effectiveness of the EU budget is the 
aspect of policy coherence. The EU budget can only have a significant 
impact if national policies are consistent with EU objectives and 
complement EU interventions. In this regard, there is a need to review 
closely the functioning and coordination of public funding across the EU.   
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GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS 
CCS  Carbon capture and storage 
CDM  Clean development mechanism 
CO2  Carbon dioxide 
CSGs  Community Strategic Guidelines  
EAFRD European  Agricultural  Fund for Rural Development 
EBRD  European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
EIB  European Investment Bank 
ERDF  European Regional Development Fund 
ESF  European Social Fund 
ETS  Emissions Trading System 
GHG Greenhouse  gas 
GNI  Gross national income 
Gt Gigatonne 
GWe Gigawatt  electric 
HVDC  High-voltage direct current 
ICT  Information and communications technology 
IEA  International Energy Agency 
ITER  International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor 
JRC  Joint Research Centre 
kWh Kilowatt  hour 
LGTT  Loan guarantee instrument for trans-European transport 
network projects 
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OECD  Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
ppm  Parts per million 
PV Photovoltaic 
R&D  Research and development 
TENs Trans-European  networks 
TEN-E  Trans-European networks for energy 
TEN-T  Trans-European networks for transport 
UNFCCC  United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
WWF  World Wide Fund for Nature 
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